Birth of a nation

Just when is a new nation born? Is it when a group truly representative of a country's people declares the country independent? Or is it when, after a struggle, independence is conclusively won on the battlefield and International recognition is confirmed? Bangladesh celebrates its National and Independence Day on March 26, the anniversary of the first proclamation of an "independent sovereign republic of Bangladesh" in a radio message broadcast from a captured station in Chittagong on March 26, 1971. The "voice of Independent Bangladesh" announced on March 28 that Major Zia, actually major Ziaur Rahman, an officer in the East Bengal Regiment who was to become President of Bangladesh in 1971, would form a new government with himself occupying the "presidency." Realizing that his action was unpopular, Zia supported a provisional government established in Calcutta by leading members of the Awami League. On April 17 the "Mujibnagar" government formally proclaimed independence and named Mujib, in prison in West Pakistan, as its president. Bangladeshi independence was not fully secured until December I6, 1971 when the Pakistan Army surrendered in Dacca to the Indian Army and Bangladeshi forces. Although the silver anniversary of December l6 was celebrated in great style, Bangladesh's annual celebration of its Independence occurs on March 26. In this, Bangladeshi practice mirrors that of the United States. We date our independence from July 4, 1776,

when the Declaration of Independence was signed, and celebrated our centennial as a nation in 1876, not in 1881, the one hundredth anniversary of Cornwallis' surrender at yorktown (roughly the equivalent of the Pakistani surrender in Dacca) nor in l883, one hundred years after the peace treaty ending the Revolutionary War was signed in Paris. The Continental Congress, of course, had always maintained itself on American soil; Bangladesh was not so fortunate. If I may be permitted a digression, I have 1ong been intrigued by the Similarities in our independence struggle and that of Bangladesh. Although East Pakistan had legally been part of Pakistan from the very beginning, the people of East pakistan had long felt that they were being exploited like a colony. Like the American colonists the Bengali "colonists" had many unaddressed grievances. Just as the fledgling U.S. owed its final victory to the timely military intervention of France at Yorktown, so did Bangladeshi Independence come about as soon as it did because of the swift and successful Indian campaign in East pakistan. Just as the U.S. was helped through much of its long struggle (1776-178l) by French arms, money and   Diplomatic support, so was Bangladesh to profit in like manner in its much shorter struggle (March - December l971) from Indian support. Just as France was motivated to help the American colonists win free from Britain because of the long-standing French-British rivalry, so did the hostility between India and Pakistan motivate India to pursue the dismemberment of Pakistan. And finally, just as the American colonists had to fight not only against the British but also against Americans who remained loyal to the King, so had the Bangladeshis to cope not only with the PakistaniArmy but also with those loyal to Pakistan, such as the Biharis, many of whom were armed by Pakistan.

Naturally, there are striking differences between our two experiences. The Bengalis of East Pakistan did not migrate from West Pakistan; they were indigenous to the area. Except for those who knew English, they did not speak the same language as their former 'rulers.' Neither George Washington nor any other Revolutionary War leader was captured and taken away to be tried for treason. And in 1776 there were no extraneous foreign powers greater than Britain and France capable of exercising an Influence, if they chose to do so, while in 197l U.S., Soviet and Chinese attitudes had to be taken into reckoning by both Pakistan and India.

******
Might there not also be a middle ground between the declaration of Independence and the winning of independence which could mark the birth of  a nation, not legally nor on the battlefield but certainly in the
hearts and minds of those who definitely renouncc any former allegiance and embrace a new nationality?

The Pakistan Foreign Service, like the Indian Foreign Service and their domestic counterparts, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), were elite organizations composed of highly competent officers, and worthy descendants of the superb Indian Civil Service (lCS). Entrance to the Pakistan Foreign Service was by competitive examination and consequently the PFS was one central government organization in which Bengalis were fairly represented. Coming from a  province where the literacy rate was higher than elsewhere in the country and where intellectual pursuits were more highly esteemed, the Bengalis shone in the competition for slots in the Foreign Service. The same was true in India where Bengalis and Tamils won more than their share of places through competitive exams.

In my Foreign Service career I was privileged to know many members of the Patistan Foreign Service, both from West and East Pakistan. They were, on the whole, an impressive group, competent, articulate and charming. As the Bangladesh crisis deepened, I watched with great interest the unfolding drama, presented in our cable traffic, at the Pakistani Foreign Service posts around the world. In many of the posts there was a sizeable number of Bengalis. What would be their reaction to the events in East Pakistan, and most particularly, to the establishment of a Bangladesh government in exile outside of Calcutta?

Bengali diplomatic personnel around the world found themselves in a difficult position. If they openly defected, they could be stranded without any means of  support in a foreign country and their families back in East Pakistan might suffer some retaliation. If the Bangladesh cause failed, they faced permanent exile abroad. And if they remained at their posts but worked covert for Bangladesh, they stood a good chance of being fired. As early as April 11 Tajuddin Ahmed, acting as head of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile in Mujibnagar, appealed to Bengali officers and Pakistani embassies around the world to serve Bangladesh, and on April 20 Mujibnagar promised that onward postings would follow a transfer of allegiance from Pakistan  to Bangladesh. But where could those postings be made, except a few to Mujibnagar itself? No nation had recognized Bangladesh.

I have thought over in my mind whether there was any parallel in U.S. history to the predicament faced by the Bengali diplomats. The only possible parallel that occurred to me was the outbreak of our Civil War. Our diplomatic and consular service at the time were too small to be considered Northern and southern officers. The majority of the southern officers left  the U.S Army to serve their individual states or the confederacy, but they departed without hindrance and went home overland to certain occupation in the confederate Army. It is not much of a parallel.
********
On April 18 the Deputy Pakistani high commissioner in Calcutta, Hussain Ali, declared his allegiance to the Bangladesh Government  in exile and took his entire Bengali staff with him. His action followed by one day the formal inauguration of the Bangladesh Government in exile in nearby Mujibnagar, and was to set off a diplomatic imbroglio between India and Pakistan that lasted for months. No two nations could be as beastly to each other on procedural issues as India and Pakistan.

It was customary for Pakistan to assign a Bengali as head of the Deputy High Commission in Calcutta, where Bengali was the language of the people. In turn, India often assigned a Bengali-speaking officer to its Deputy High Commission in Dacca, and the current Deputy Hicommissioner was a Bengali, Sen Gupta. When the departing Bengali staff in Calcutta took over the office premises and its property, the Government of Pakistan requested the Government of India  to evict the Bengalis and enable the newly appointed Deputy High Commissioner, Mehdi Masud, to take charge of the Pakistani Embassy, the Government of India, while accepting Mr. Masud as the new Deputy High Commission and giving assurances that they would help him to recover control of the mission and its property, actually put many obstacles in Mr. Masud's way.

As a consequence, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad by note on April 23 that Pakistan had decided to close its Deputy High Commission in Calcutta as of noon April 26. The note went on to state that since the Calcutta mission  had been established under a rcciprocal arrangement, the Government  of Pakistan requested the Governrnent of India to close down its Deputy high Commission in Dacca on the same date. Pakistan proposed that the repatriation of Indian personnel and their families from Dacca should take place simultaneously with the release of Pakistani personnel and their families stranded in Calcutta. But it was not to be that easy. The Indians in Dacca and the Pakistanis In Calcutta essentially became two sets of hapless hostages whose release depended upon the successful negotiation of a number of procedural problems. One of the complicating issues was that Mr. Masud in Calcutta insisted on interviewing each of the Bengali defectors separately, but they refused to be interviewed except as a group.

ln Dacca Sen Gupta and his staff were kept under close house arrest, Sen Gupta in his own home and the staff members in other houses. Sen Gupta could send a servant out to make food purchases but only to the nearest market and only if accompanied by police and soldiers. Each time the servant was stripped and searched. Sen Gupta was unable to meet with his staff. In May the wife of one staff member was permitted to go to the American Catholic hospital for the birth of a baby and the husband was allowed to visit her under police guard. I understand that the situation of one of the Pakistanis in Calcutta was quite comparable. Sir Cyril Pickard, the British High Commissioner to Pakistan, sought permission to pay a call on Sen Gupta, but was not allowed to do so. I also sought permission which was refused. However, on May 8 the Indian authorities allowed Herb Gordon, our Consul General in Calcutta and an old friend from Athens days, to call on the Pakistani Deputy High Commissioner. Reciprocally, I was then permitted to visit Sen Gupta.

I found him in surprisingly good spirits, considering the circumstances. His greatest concern was the welfare of his staff. He, of course, had his work and a radio, but it was still a lonely and frustrating existence, one which he seemed to bear with great fortitude. I took along several bottles of Scotch and some sweets, which he declared to be very welcome. Years later, when I was serving in New Delhi, I had a pleasant reunion with Sen Gupta who had recently retired after serving as Ambassador in a South American country. Negotiations between India and Pakistan dragged on until well after I left Dacca, finally being resolved as a result of Swiss mediation. I understood that the ultimate solution called for Soviet planes to airlift the Indians from Dacca to New Delhi and Iranian planes to take the Pakistanis from Calcutta to Karachi.
*******
On April 26 Mahmood Ali, a Vice Consul in the Pakistan Consulate General in New York, defected and declared his allegiance to Bangladesh. He was, I believe, the first Pakistani diplomat to do so outside of India. (In addition to Hussain Ali and his Bengali staff in Calcutta, several Bengali diplomats had earlier defected in New Delhi.) Mahmood Ali's wife went to work to support the family, and their home in New York City was for a while an unofficial Bangladesh mission to the UN. Subsequently Mahmood Ali was to become Bangladesh Ambassador to Germany. A revolt was also slowly brewing among the many Bengalis in Pakistan's mission to the UN and the Embassy in Washington. The first at the Embassy to openly defect was my old friend from 1960-62, A.M.A. Muhith, who was serving as Economic Counselor. Muhith declared his allegiance to Bangladesh in June, although ever since March 25 he and his wife Sabia had labored hard but unofficially in lobbying the Congress and organizing support for the Bangladesh cause among Bengali resident in the U.S. and sympathetic Americans, in and out of government. The Bengali diplomats in the U.S. were naturally concerned about their sustenance once they broke openly with Pakistan and set up competing Bangladesh missions in Washington and New York. Funding was sought from both the Bengali community in the U.S. and the Bangladesh Government at Mujibnagar, with the intention of making a mass renunciation of their allegiance to Pakistan and proclaiming their commitment to Bangladesh. Meanwhile they continued to go to their offices in New York and Washington but campaigned quietly from their homes with their friends and acquaintances in the State Department and the Congress. On July 5 Mujibnagar asked all Bengali diplomats posted abroad to transfer their allegiance. The Bangladesh government in exile decided to establish Bangladesh missions abroad and undertook to pay for the expenses of the missions and their staffs. The Bengali diplomats in the U.S. agreed to transfer their allegiance in the following month.

On August 4 all the Bengali officers and staff in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, the Pakistan Consulate General in New York and the Pakistan permanent Mission to the UN in New York transferred their allegiance to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh mission was formally established in Washington as a registered foreign agent, and continued in operation until it became an embassy after the U.S. recognized Bangladesh on April 4, l972. Bangladesh was moving quickly from a dream to a reality. A new Nation was being born, although the birth pangs were still far from over.

(The chapter is taken from Archar k Blood’s The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh.)


The author was an American career diplomat.  He served as the last American Consul General to Dhaka, Bangladesh