The Bangladesh Liberation War was territorially a small one confined as it did to about fifty- six thousand square miles. But in a global context, the war had wide ramifications involving the three major power players i.e. USA, (the then) USSR and PRC. Resultantly, this shortest liberation war of eight months and twenty-one days had its impact felt globally. Of the regional powers, India had a special involvement ab initio.
The Bangladesh Liberation War took place at a time when the global order was in a state of flux. On the one hand, the influence of the then two superpowers the USA and the USSR had been on the wane, but not totally absent. Moreover, the intensity of the Cold War between these powers appeared to be less than before.
On the other hand, Russo-Chinese relations had a nosedive. In tandem, however, China was demonstrating its big power proclivities. The Bangladesh Liberation War took place against such a global context. In the regional context, the Indian role figured prominently as the country drew world attention with the cogent argument that the international community had a moral responsibility in stopping genocide in Bangladesh.
As the Bangladesh war induced power configuration emerged it was found that two axial groups were operating: US-China and Indo-Soviet. The former group was anti-Bangladesh; while the latter pro-Bangladesh. Each group had its own axe to grind based on its national interest. Above all, the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War had its impact felt globally.
This paper revisits the relevant narrative insofar as the involvement of the global and regional powers was concerned. Each section is devoted to each discussed power. Avoiding known factual details analytical comments are concentrated on.
SOUTH ASIA IN STRATEGIC
CONTEXT
Bangladesh is a part of the landmass of the strategic South Asian subcontinent. The landmass along with its sea frontage has been of significance for over a long time; and this significance has drawn outside powers to this subcontinent many a time.
The first recorded reference to the strategic importance of the subcontinent was made by the Indian Viceroy Lord Curzon in 1903 when he stated, "The Indian subcontinent because of its geographical location would gradually assume a significant place in international politics."3 In fact, as of today, this subcontinent and its sea frontage to the vast and resourceful Indian Ocean occupies a pivotal position to any outside power with global stakes.
The subcontinent assumes more significance as the bridge between the East and the West. In this context, Norman D. Palmer made the pertinent observation: "In the growing encounter between Asia and the West, South Asia is obviously an area of special significance. It is today a major center of world attention and concern."
This subcontinent has always been the centre of attention of the three big powers. It is true that the subcontinent has never been the cause of direct confrontation between and among them; but, nevertheless, there were occasions of diplomatic face-off. The Bangladesh Liberation war was one such occasion.
USA
The USA pursued an anti-Bangladesh policy ab initio. The determinants of this policy were specifically four. First, Pakistan had been a close ally since the 1950s. Second, Pakistan had been a dependable ally in US Middle East policy. Third, Pakistan was a conduit in thawing Washington-Beijing relationship. In such a context, the Bangladesh war burst upon as an unwanted complexity.
Fourth, personally, Nixon was anti-Indian. It is on record that during the 1969 trip he was treated well in Pakistan, but not so in India. It remains arguable that such a personal factor could have any influence in the overall policymaking process; but with hindsight, it cannot be ruled out.
PHASES OF POLICY
The US policy had three discernible phases. First, strategic neutrality up to July. This phase witnessed a call for political solution and flow of aid for the Bangalee refugees in India. Between July and December, Washington had an entirely pro-Pakistan stance, but with an intent to averting a slide into a full-scale war.
During this phase Washington concentrated on ping-pong diplomacy to mend fences with China. Consequently, this phase ended up as a fiasco as far as South Asia was concerned .Third, between 3 and 16 December, when the Indo-Pak war had been raging, the US policy was one of clear tilt to Pakistan.
As the war neared the end with debacle of the Pakistan occupation forces Washington made the last ditch attempt to save Pakistan by dispatching the Seventh Fleet and trying to secure a ceasefire through the UN. The first failed because of quick appearance of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet as a countervailing force; and the second had the same fate as the Soviet Union vetoed in the Security Council.
Despite such an anti-Bangladesh stance of Washington a large number of American politicians, intellectuals and the media played a positive role in standing by Bangladesh. Of the politicians, Senator Edward Kennedy was ardently outspoken in critiquing the official policy.
The recently made public US documents reveal that the debacle of Pakistan was something that the policymakers had a hunch about.
On 6
March, Dr. Kissinger chaired a Senior Review Group (SRG) meeting wherein it was stated, "The judgment of all of us is that with the number of troops available to Yahya (a total of 20,000, with 12,000 combat troops) and hostile East Pakistan population of 75 million, the result would be a bloodbath with no hope of West Pakistan reestablishing control over East Pakistan."8 Why did then Washington stick to its pro- Pakistan stance? The China factor comes up with requisite explanation. Washington sought China first or foremost and until the China issue was settled Washington wanted a status quo. Washington got China, but lost the South Asian diplomacy in 1971.
USSR
As for the determinants of the Soviet policy we have to consider Moscow's consternation at Pakistan's virulent anti-Indianism and too much Chinese leaning. The Awami League victory in the 1970 elections made Moscow optimistic that under the Awami League government relations with Pakistan would be satisfactory.
But the Pakistan military crackdown sent out a message of grave concern. Under such circumstances, Moscow had to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the Bangladesh war. On the other hand, Moscow was concerned that a prolonged liberation war would radicalise South Asia to the detriment of its close ally India. Consequently, in the beginning Moscow's policy was one of putting pressure on Pakistan for a political solution.
PHASES OF POLICY
Between April and July the Soviet policy could be called one of caution and ambivalence. At the 24th Congress of CPSU held on 30 March, Breznev called upon Moscow to eliminate hotbeds of war in South East Asia and Middle East, and to promote a political settlement in those areas on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of states and peoples subjected to aggression ….full use must also be made of the possibilities of the United Nations. Repudiation of threat or use of force in settling outstanding issues must become a law of international life."
It was clear from the beginning that Moscow did not want a breakup of Pakistan, and in consequence of which emergence of a war-ravaged weak Bangladesh. On 2 April, therefore, Podgorny wrote to Yahya calling, for stopping bloodshed and finding a speedy political solution. It is to be noted that Podgorny's letter did not mention Bangladesh, but 'East Pakistan' and the words, "common masses of Pakistan" were used.
By June, the Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh pleaded with Kremlin to come out more definitely in favour of Bangladesh; but to no avail. The second phase of the policy spanned the period between July and December. This phase was one of tilt and caution. The soviet policy began to demonstrate a decided shift towards Bangladesh after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty on 9 August.
From September through November the Soviet policy had three apparent features. First, Moscow accepted the Indian view that the Bangladesh crisis was outside the jurisdiction of the UN. Second, Moscow wanted the liberation war to be pro-Soviet. Third, Moscow shared a common stance with Washington in averting a full-scale war.
But the war could not be prevented. Pakistani air raid on the western border of India provoked the war on 3 December, which continued up to the fall of Dhaka on 16 December. During these two weeks, as has been mentioned above, Moscow took two decisive steps in scuttling Washington moves to save Pakistan.
But it is worth mentioning that on 6 and 7 December, Moscow tabled two resolutions providing for a just political solution within the framework of Pakistan, which, however, miscarried."
It may, therefore, be said that the Soviet policy was never openly anti-Pakistan or pro-Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the overall impact of Soviet doings was conducive to the emergence of Bangladesh, and hence the popular contention that the Soviet Union was pro-Bangladesh.
CHINA
There were two broad phases in the Chinese policy. First, China calculatedly refrained from supporting the Bangladesh war. Second, an unqualified support was extended to the Pakistan military regime. Such a policy stance remained unchanged even after repeated pleadings from Maulana Bhasani, supposedly a staunch Beijing ally.
This policy had two discernible aspects. Up to 3 December, Beijing cohorted with Washington in opposing Bangladesh, but refrained from using any anti- Bangalee rhetorics (this did not, however, mean that the doings of Beijing were not inimical to Bangladesh). But, between 3 and 16 December, Beijing was openly anti-Bangladesh, both in words and action.
Beijing faced a dilemma vis-a-vis the Bangladesh war. On the one hand, its socialist ideology required support for the Bangalees; but, on the other, it had its national and strategic interests to be served. As it was, the latter imperative got the upper hand.
The Chinese policy was revealed in the two initial documents. On 11 April, The People's Daily had the opening statement representing official policy, wherein Russia was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan.
On 13 April, Chou-En lai wrote to Yahya reiterating Chinese support for safeguarding Pakistan's 'national independence' and 'state sovereignty. This letter has been criticized as "a brazen attempt to cover up Peking's approval of the massacre of the Bengalees."
A retrospective analysis reveals at least five determinants for such a policy. First, China is itself a multi-ethnic country; and, hence could not countenance a secessionist ethnic struggle. In the past, China had always opposed such struggles in many countries. Second, China considered the Bangalee struggle as had been provoked by India and Russia, and it was not a spontaneous one.
Third, in the Chinese perception, the Bangladesh war was a bourgeois one, not for the sake of workers and peasants. Fourth, China did not have any evidence that the Bangali freedom fighters had been inspired by the Red Book of Mao-Ze dong.
Fifth; as the Mujibnagar Government was located in India, and as the Indian government had overbearing influence on this government, Beijing was led to believe that Bangladesh would eventually be an Indo-Soviet satellite state, and which would be the inimical one close to its border. Therefore the emergence of Bangladesh would be a threat to Chinese security.
INDIA
The Bangladesh Liberation War sans Indian assistance would not have the history that it has been. Indira Gandhi's statement on 10 January
1972 at the Delhi Airport while welcoming Bangabandhu summed up the contours of Indian policy succinctly. She said, "Sheikh Mujibur Rahman promised independence to his people, and he has fulfilled. I promised to send Bangladesh refugees back home with honour, to extend all help to freedom fighters and to free Sheikh Mujibur, the unquestioned leader of Bangladesh, from the Pakistani incarceration. I have also kept my promise."
In fact, from the beginning to the end of the war, Indian support and assistance were of crucial importance to Bangladesh. Government, media and common people were found solidly by the Mijubnagar Government. About 10 million refugees were given shelter, food and medicine. In the state of Tripura, the number of refugees exceeded that of the locals.
But the contributions of Indira Gandhi tower above anyone or any quarter. She made Bangladesh an international issue through fiery speeches in parliament and tour through Western capitals. She also brought the then Soviet Union completely over to Bangladesh side by signing on 9 August 1971 the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.
When critiqued by some as the treaty being a compromise of Indian non-alignment she retorted by saying "India will continue to follow its policy of non-alignment as before. This treaty was a master-stroke of diplomacy, which sent out a strong message of caution to the enemies of Bangladesh. As it appears in retrospect, Indira Gandhi acted as the midwife delivering the Bangladesh baby, as it were, through something like a caesarean operation.
The direct participation of the Indian forces as allied forces expedited the fall of Dhaka. Without such a participation the liberation of Bangladesh would have dragged on with an uncertain future; and here lies the significance of this participation.
Indian policy vis-a-vis Bangladesh had four specific determinants. The primary consideration was undoubtedly humanitarian; and, in this respect India became a role model. Second, although controversial but not unrealistic, that in the emergence of Bangladesh India visualized cutting to size its adversary Pakistan. This was the opinion expressed by K. Subramanyam on 3rd March at the Institute of Defence and strategic Analyses (IDSA) meeting.
Third, the load of refugees was a burden which could not economically be sustained indefinitely, India, therefore, had a stake in a quick end to the war thereby facilitating safe return of refugees. Fourth, a prolongation of the liberation war would have complicated the Naxalite problem and radicalized the volatile Northeast. So politically, a quick and successful end to the war was in India's interest.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Two clear observations emerge out of this discussion. First, despite apparent difference of stance between Washington and Moscow vis-a-vis the Bangladesh war there was an implicit common ground between the two. Such a common ground is revealed in the National Security Staff memorandum of 25 May 1971 to Kissinger. It was written, "In the short run at least we share a strong interest with the Soviets in avoiding another.
Indo-Pak War. The Soviets have very little clout in Islamabad but they do have a 'special relationship' with New Delhi. Is it possible and desirable to encourage the Soviets to play a peacemaking role? Or would some sort of consultation and joint, or at least parallel action with the Soviets be more in our interests?" There is hardly any doubt that until 3 December the US-Soviet policy evolved the way suggested in the memorandum.
Second, despite flurry of rhetorics, the pro or anti-Bangladesh policy of the involved powers was determined not by any ideology but by national strategic interest.
(This article was the keynote presentation on 28 September 2018 at a seminar on "1971: Liberation War, Genocide and The World" organised by Itihas Sammilani in Dhaka)
The writer is Bangabandhu Chair Professor at Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP). Email:
[email protected]
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