Published: 08:15 PM, 13 April 2026
Pakistan’s Mediation Ambitions and China’s Quiet Discontent
Pakistan’s efforts to position itself as a mediator in the US–Israel–Iran tensions face cautious reception from China. Emerging divergences over Afghanistan and US alignment are testing the limits of the ‘all-weather’ China-Pakistan partnership
Recently, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Beijing. This visit came at a crucial time and was largely aimed at securing China’s support for Pakistan’s proposed mediation role in the ongoing US–Israel–Iran tensions. It followed a meeting in Islamabad that brought together countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to explore potential mediation efforts. However, when that initiative failed to yield tangible results, Pakistan turned to China.
China, however, has responded cautiously rather than endorsing. It has reportedly warned Pakistan to first resolve its issues with Afghanistan, emphasising that a country seeking to act as a mediator cannot simultaneously engage in aggressive actions against its neighbour. Such contradictions undermine credibility and send the wrong message about Pakistan’s suitability as a neutral negotiator.
Beijing’s Cold Response
As a result, at Beijing’s directive, a meeting was convened in Urumqi, China, involving mid-level delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan to address escalating tensions. The talks primarily focused on ceasefire efforts, counterterrorism concerns, and the reopening of border crossings, but yielded no significant breakthrough, remaining largely preliminary and confidence-building in nature. Simultaneously, a jirga was held in Peshawar on March 31, 2026, involving tribal elders, political figures, and civil society representatives, calling for a ceasefire and dialogue to de-escalate tensions; however, its impact remained limited, as no one from Afghanistan attended it. Earlier, Beijing had urged restraint in the escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but Pakistan did not heed this call. Shortly thereafter, on March 16, 2026, a Pakistani airstrike on the Omid Addiction Treatment Hospital in Kabul resulted in the deaths of at least 400 people, with many more injured.
Moreover, China has not demonstrated the level of willingness or proactiveness toward Pakistan’s mediation proposals that was widely expected or projected in sections of the media. This is evident from the bilateral meeting held in Beijing on March 31, 2026, between Wang Yi and Ishaq Dar, following which China outlined a five-point initiative. The proposal emphasised an immediate cessation of hostilities, the promotion of dialogue and negotiations, the protection of civilians, the safeguarding of maritime routes, and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. Notably, these points reflect a broad, generalised articulation of diplomatic principles rather than concrete, action-oriented commitments, indicating a cautious, non-committal posture. Given that Iran has also been targeting other Gulf countries, where China has significant strategic and economic stakes, Beijing’s response to this conflict has remained balanced.
China may be covertly supporting Iran through intelligence sharing and real-time satellite imagery, but that remains a separate aspect; publicly, it has maintained a balanced stance. Simultaneously, China is well aware of Pakistan’s mediation efforts – occurring within a broader US-led diplomatic framework – and is therefore proceeding with caution and pragmatism.
Beijing’s Growing Unease Over Pakistan’s Regional Posture
Especially under Field Marshal Asif Munir, considered a favoured figure of US President Trump, Pakistan has not taken China’s security interests in Afghanistan into account and has repeatedly undermined them. It has continued military aggression against Afghanistan. This has not only raised concerns in Beijing but also forced China to recalibrate its regional approach.
China’s unease is rooted in its long-term strategic and economic investments across the region. Beijing has invested heavily in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, while simultaneously seeking to expand connectivity into Afghanistan through emerging trade corridors and economic integration. In recent years, China has also increased its economic footprint in Afghanistan, recognising the country’s geostrategic location as a critical gateway linking Central Asia, South Asia, and West Asia – an important component of its broader connectivity ambitions under the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s concerns are further shaped by security considerations, particularly the risk of extremism emanating from Afghanistan. Beijing remains wary of terror groups operating in the region, especially those that could potentially spill over into its Xinjiang region. Stability in Afghanistan is therefore central to China’s wider regional vision, not only to safeguard its economic investments and connectivity projects but also to ensure internal security and prevent the spread of extremism along its western frontiers.
Pakistan’s current approach, however, appears to run counter to these objectives. It has continued military operations in Afghanistan, including airstrikes targeting multiple locations such as Bagram Airfield, contributing to escalating tensions. While Pakistan justifies these actions as counterterrorism measures, they have intensified instability in the region. Beijing is also aware that if Pakistan helps the United States gain access to Bagram Air Base, it could be used for surveillance against China. It has also been attempting to pursue regime change dynamics in Afghanistan through propaganda, seeking to create and amplify divisions between Kabul and Kandahar factions of the Taliban, even where such divisions do not meaningfully exist, and has sought to undermine the Taliban, which it perceives as having closer ties with New Delhi.
Moreover, Pakistan has received full support from the United States, which has recently backed its “right to defend itself” against the Afghan Taliban, thereby reinforcing its position even as tensions continue to escalate. Moreover, Pakistan’s Field Marshal has reportedly assured Trump that it would assist the United States in recovering weapons worth billions of dollars left behind in Afghanistan. This divergence has created friction with China, which views stability as essential for safeguarding its investments and regional ambitions.
This evolving dynamic is also reflected in the slowing momentum of CPEC. China has significantly reduced and slowed funding for the project. Pakistan repeatedly invokes CPEC in its statements during meetings with China in an effort to secure renewed financial support, but Beijing has scaled back its engagement due to concerns over corruption, terror attacks on its workers, and increasing instability in the country. At the same time, Pakistan has turned to alternative sources, with the Asian Development Bank stepping in to fund certain sections of the project where Chinese financing has stalled.
However, despite these tensions, it appears that China continues to avoid openly criticising Pakistan, preferring instead to express its concerns through calibrated diplomatic messaging.
End of Pakistan’s Dual Alignment Strategy
The broader question that emerges is whether Pakistan can continue to balance relations with China and the United States in the near future. While such a strategy may have been feasible during the Cold War or in the period that followed – when the US had not yet declared China a strategic rival and was attempting to accommodate it in the liberal capitalist order, even granting it membership in the WTO in 2001 – today’s realities have fundamentally changed. The United States and China now view each other as strategic rivals, with active containment strategies unfolding across regions, from the Western Hemisphere to the Indo-Pacific.
In this context, it will become increasingly difficult for Pakistan going ahead to maintain closer ties with both. While Pakistan was able to do so in the past, today’s realities have changed. Previously, both the US and China tolerated Pakistan’s behaviour because they saw it primarily in terms of how it could be leveraged against India. Now, as their systemic rivalry intensifies and expands, and both focus on grand geostrategic initiatives to outcompete one another, it will become increasingly difficult for Pakistan to continue this balancing act. Two tigers cannot live on the same mountain – both are strategic rivals now. Their spheres of influence increasingly overlap in Pakistan, where Beijing’s economic and infrastructure footprint through CPEC intersects with Washington’s interests. As competition between these powers intensifies, Pakistan’s strategic room for manoeuvre will increasingly narrow. Current trends suggest that Pakistan is gradually aligning more closely with the United States, a shift that has not gone unnoticed in Beijing.
Thus, while China may not publicly express dissatisfaction, the signs of unease are evident. Ishaq Dar’s visit to Beijing, instead of securing strong backing for mediation efforts, elicited only a cautious, principle-based response. This reflects a deeper reality: all is not well in China-Pakistan relations, and emerging divergences – particularly over Afghanistan and U.S. alignment – are beginning to reshape the trajectory of this once “all-weather” partnership.
Written by: Dr Imran Khurshid (The author is an Associate Research Fellow, ICPS, Adjunct Fellow, Peninsula Foundation, Visiting Faculty, Nalanda University, Rajgir, Bihar, India and the views expressed here are personal.)
>> Source: PRF
