Published: 09:44 AM, 18 August 2026
Most Iranians Do Not Want Theocracy to Return
For nearly five decades, Iran's political identity has been shaped by the Islamic Republic and its system of clerical rule. But beneath the official slogans and political institutions, public attitudes have been changing.
A substantial body of survey evidence indicates that many Iranians no longer want a political system governed by religious law and would prefer a democratic, secular alternative.
This does not mean that every Iranian wants the same kind of government. Iran's opposition is politically diverse, with supporters of secular republicanism, constitutional monarchy, reformist politics and other systems.
What increasingly unites many citizens is opposition to the idea that religious authority should determine the country's political system.
A 2022 survey by the GAMAAN Research Institute found that 88 percent of respondents considered a democratic political system either "very good" or "fairly good". In contrast, 67 percent regarded a system governed by religious law as either "fairly bad" or "very bad". Only about 28 percent considered religious government a good option. The survey covered more than 16,000 respondents living inside Iran and was designed to reflect literate Iranian residents over the age of 19.
The preference for a secular political order was also visible when respondents were asked which type of regime would be most suitable for Iran. In the same survey, 33.6 percent selected a secular republic, compared with 22.4 percent who preferred the Islamic Republic. Constitutional monarchy received 19.1 percent, while 21.5 percent said they were not sufficiently informed to answer.
More recent GAMAAN findings point in the same direction. In a 2024 survey asking how Iranians would vote in a free referendum on the question "Islamic Republic: Yes or No?", 74.6 percent said they would vote no, while 16.5 percent said yes. Although polling in an authoritarian environment is inherently difficult and no single survey can perfectly represent an entire population, the results provide an important indication of public dissatisfaction.
The rejection of theocratic rule is closely connected to the experience of everyday life. Iran's younger generations have grown up amid economic sanctions, inflation, unemployment, restrictions on political expression and extensive controls over personal behaviour. For many young Iranians, particularly women, the question of political freedom is inseparable from the question of personal freedom.
The 2022 nationwide protests following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini became a defining expression of this frustration. The demonstrations began over women's rights and compulsory hijab enforcement but quickly developed into a wider challenge to the political establishment. The slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom" came to represent demands for dignity, personal autonomy and political change.
Women have remained central to this challenge. Many Iranian women have publicly resisted compulsory dress restrictions despite the possibility of arrest or punishment. The persistence of such resistance demonstrates that social attitudes cannot easily be changed through legislation or policing.
Economic hardship has added another layer to the dissatisfaction. Iran has faced years of sanctions, currency instability, high inflation and declining purchasing power. More recently, prolonged regional conflict has placed additional pressure on an already strained economy. Reports in 2026 have described rising food prices, unemployment and growing public anxiety about the country's economic future.
For ordinary Iranians, political ideology is therefore not an abstract question. It is connected to employment, household income, education, access to information, freedom of movement and the ability to make personal choices. When government institutions are associated with economic hardship and restrictions on daily life, support for the existing political system can weaken.
Yet it would be wrong to assume that rejecting the Islamic Republic automatically means supporting a return to the monarchy that preceded it. Iran's political opposition is deeply divided over what should replace the current system. Some favour a secular republic, while others support a constitutional monarchy. Still others want different forms of democratic government.
The debate over Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran's last shah, illustrates this complexity. Pahlavi has presented himself as a potential bridge toward a democratic transition rather than simply a candidate for restoration of the monarchy. However, his movement has faced criticism and has struggled to unite Iran's fragmented opposition. Reuters recently reported that his campaign has encountered organizational difficulties and disagreements among opposition groups.
This division is significant. Opposition to the Islamic Republic does not automatically produce agreement about what comes next. The experience of the 1979 revolution remains an important historical memory. Many Iranians may want fundamental political change while simultaneously fearing instability, authoritarianism or another concentration of power.
That is why the strongest demand emerging from available polling is not necessarily for one particular political personality or ideology, but for greater political choice. GAMAAN's research has repeatedly shown strong support for democracy and significant opposition to government based on religious law. In its 2024 analysis, the institute reported that around 89 percent of Iranians supported democracy, while only about one-fifth supported continuation of the Islamic Republic.
The country's leadership faces an increasingly difficult task in responding to these attitudes. Repression may suppress demonstrations temporarily, but it cannot easily erase changing social expectations. Young people who have access to global culture and information are unlikely to accept the same political restrictions as previous generations without questioning them.
At the same time, Iran's future cannot be determined solely by opinion polls. Political transitions depend on institutions, leadership, economic conditions, security forces and the ability of opposition groups to cooperate. A fragmented opposition could struggle to convert public dissatisfaction into a coherent political alternative.
The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether Iranians want the Islamic Republic to continue. Increasing evidence suggests that many do not. The larger question is what kind of political system they would choose if given a genuinely free choice.
The answer appears to be diverse rather than uniform. Some want a secular republic. Some prefer constitutional monarchy. Others remain undecided. But the common thread is increasingly clear: a significant portion of Iranian society wants political authority separated from compulsory religious rule and wants citizens to have a greater say in determining their country's future.
After decades of theocracy, Iran appears to be experiencing a profound generational and social transformation. The desire for freedom, democratic participation and personal choice is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
If Iran eventually reaches a moment of political transition, the country may discover that its most important debate is not about restoring the past, but about allowing its people to choose the future.
