When it comes to the foreign policy and geographic location of Bangladesh, its nearest neighbour, India, is the most relevant one. A sovereign country shapes its foreign policy based on the importance of other countries; needless to say, India is one of the most important countries to Bangladesh. However, there is an established misconception about the bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and India.
Indian foreign policy has contributed to the relationship but has also, in a sense, failed because it viewed Bangladesh largely through the lens of the Awami League. India could not fully sense the changing pulse of the Bangladeshi people throughout these years. So, when Sheikh Hasina was ousted, India appeared less prepared to deal with other important actors in Bangladesh. India must take cognizance of the stand and expectations of its neighbouring country.
Shekhar Gupta, the editor of The Print, wrote on 19 September 2026 that, "Shehbaz Sharif and Tarique Rahman won single-party elections. That lack of legitimacy undermines both. It matters more in Dhaka. To that extent, both 'elected' governments are weak and under-confident. That's why Rahman constantly has to look sideways and backwards for the Jamaat. It's a cruel irony, but he appears a weak prime minister despite his humongous majority."
One may question the framing of a legitimately elected government as "weak and under-confident" simply because it maintains its own political position and foreign-policy choices. Such characterizations can also contribute to a perception gap between India and Bangladesh. Gupta's broader commentary on Bangladesh-India relations similarly reflects an ongoing debate about how New Delhi should understand the country's changing political landscape.
For the sake of this write-up, another reference can be given: First Post, an Indian online portal, reported on September 18 with the headline, "Dhaka turns its back on India; is Jamaat setting the tone?" The headline itself reflects one interpretation of Bangladesh's recent foreign-policy posture, while the underlying developments should be understood in the wider context of Bangladesh's evolving political and diplomatic priorities.
The thing for India to understand is that Bangladesh is not a vassal state; it can make its own decisions based on its interests.
To counter the quote from The Print, one may say that there are numerous reasons why the people of Bangladesh are not as fond of India as they used to be.
Sheikh Hasina alone is enough as an example. The allegations of severe human rights abuses and killings during her government, alongside her continued presence in India, have become an important issue in Bangladeshi public discourse. India cannot ignore the impact of this issue on public sentiment in Bangladesh.
India's continued allowance of Sheikh Hasina to use its territory and media platforms for political messaging raises concerns about Bangladesh's sovereignty and domestic political process. In her latest September 22 NDTV interview, Hasina said she plans to return by December 2026, rebuild the Awami League and rejected the judicial proceedings against her. New Delhi should exercise greater restraint to prevent its territory from becoming a platform for Bangladesh's political contestation.
When PM Tarique Rahman did not attend the BRICS Summit held in New Delhi, Indian online portal The Print stated that, "He (Tarique Rahman) isn't willing to learn from the Chinese, who might protest each time the Dalai Lama speaks up but haven't let his presence ruin their post-1988 engagement with India."
On July 21, 2025, The Hindu published a written interview with Chinese Ambassador to India H.E. Xu Feihong, where he said that, "The 14th Dalai Lama is not a pure religious figure, but a political exile engaging in anti-China separatist activities under the cloak of religion and attempting to split Xizang from China. China consistently and firmly opposes any form of engagement between officials of any country and the 14th Dalai Lama."
The basic allegation against the Dalai Lama, from the Chinese government's perspective, is that he is a separatist, anti-China and using religion as a political cover. These allegations are fundamentally different from allegations concerning human rights violations.
Therefore, comparing the Dalai Lama to Sheikh Hasina is not an ideal choice. Such a comparison risks treating fundamentally different political and human-rights questions as though they were the same.
Bangladesh has its own set of expectations from the bilateral relationship, centred on mutual benefits for both peoples and a forward-looking, mutually respectful partnership. Its foreign policy should uphold sovereign equality, national interests and dignity, while ensuring that national interest remains at the heart of every decision and international engagement.
A confident and forward-looking "Bangladesh First" approach should pursue constructive and mutually beneficial relations with all countries, guided by reciprocal interests rather than external pressures or historical assumptions.
Another prime concern of Bangladesh is that border issues must be solved. Border killings remain an Achilles' heel of the bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and India. According to Human Rights Support Society data, at least 305 Bangladeshis were killed and 282 injured in BSF firing and related border incidents over the past decade. The figures have also been cited by The Daily Star, which reported that the HRSS figures were based on media reports and the organization's own findings.
Push-ins have become another important aspect in this regard. According to the BGB, India's BSF has intensified efforts in recent times to push people into Bangladesh. Since early June, there have been several such attempts. At least 2,303 people were pushed into Bangladesh between May 2025 and January this year, according to the figures cited in this discussion. Among them were 126 Indian nationals and 38 Myanmar nationals.
India should pursue equitable and transparent water-sharing arrangements with Bangladesh, particularly on the Ganges and Teesta. It should strengthen real-time data sharing and accelerate negotiations on shared rivers through established bilateral mechanisms. Greater cooperation on flood management, water conservation and river-basin development can help build long-term trust between the two countries.
On 5 August 2026, Sheikh Hasina conducted a press conference on Indian soil in New Delhi under the Modi government. This directly affects the sentiment of the Bangladeshi people, and the government cannot overlook it. The Bangladesh government issued an official statement calling on India to prevent the conference, but India did not heed the request. India must address this issue and recognize its impact on bilateral relations.
For Bangladesh's younger generation, politics is increasingly about their everyday hopes, opportunities and future, rather than only the narratives of the past. They want a Bangladesh that can stand on its own feet, protect its dignity and national interests, and maintain respectful relations with all countries while giving its people a meaningful voice in shaping the future.
India-Bangladesh relations cannot be sustained through historical ties or diplomatic engagement alone. The relationship must reflect the realities of a sovereign Bangladesh, the expectations of its people and the changing political landscape. For India, recognizing Bangladesh's sovereign equality, addressing border killings and push-ins, resolving water-sharing issues, and responding sensitively to matters that affect Bangladeshi public sentiment would provide a stronger foundation for bilateral relations. For Bangladesh, constructive engagement with India remains important, but such engagement should be based on mutual respect, national interest and equal dignity. A forward-looking relationship will ultimately depend not on one country accommodating the other, but on both countries addressing their concerns through dialogue, transparency and mutual respect.
>>Daniel Pinto, AA
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