Considerations on the Post-Pandemic World: GB Interview with Bilahari Kausikan

GB: Let’s start with post-pandemic China. How do you see post-pandemic China shaping up?

BK: One of the big things that has happened over the last 10 years – even before the pandemic – is a significant diminution in China’s international image globally. The degree may differ from country to country, but while China’s achievements have been widely recognized – nobody would deny them – the wrinkles and warts have begun to show much more than before. The Zero-Covid policy was just one example: the chaotic forced exit from Zero-Covid certainly did not help.

I think that China is still a great story. It is the greatest story of the 20th century. And it will be an important geopolitical player. But everybody now a better understanding that this is not some supernatural entity that is destined to rise indefinitely with supernatural powers or something like that. It is a country with great strengths but also great flaws – both of which the pandemic threw into sharp relief.

GB: What are some of these Chinese strengths and weaknesses coming out of the pandemic?

BK: The pre- and post-pandemic strengths and weaknesses remain unchanged. The pandemic just highlighted them. China has always been able to set goals and pursue them relentlessly over the long term. That can be a great strength when compared with some of the more changeable Western democracies. However, the ability to set and pursue goals over the long run is only a strength if the goal that you choose is the correct one in the first place. Two ends of the spectrum in this regard are Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Mao’s decisions to pursue the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were unmitigated disasters. Millions of people died. On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping’s decision to open up and reform was the correct one, with results now known to all.

Now, I do not think that in any other system, a man who has spent his whole life on one track could one day get up and take a look at his life’s work, decide that it is all going wrong and, with very little opposition, turn it around. So Deng Xiaoping’s decision was right, while Mao’s was wrong. Where does Xi Jinping stand in this? Answer: Somewhere in the middle, but certainly tending toward mistakes. His record of governance has not been a stellar one.

I often challenge people, and I similarly challenge GB readers around the world: Think of a single initiative that Xi has led on his watch, over the last 10 years, that you can honestly say was a complete, unqualified success. I cannot think of any. There have been successes, but ones like the eradication of extreme poverty built largely on the work of previous leaders since Deng Xiaoping.

As for the management of the pandemic – the Zero-Covid policy, the way they dealt with it, and the chaotic retreat from it – we cannot say that this was a policy success for China. Do not forget that there were very large, spontaneous demonstrations across China – probably the largest since Tiananmen. These demonstrations brought together what is a very dangerous combination of workers and students – for anyone who knows Chinese history. Xi therefore had to change course.

And now – some people might say – he is mitigating his controls over the tech sector. That is true, to some degree, but he is doing that within a new fence that he has erected around the sector. Of course, it is too early to say whether that is the way to deal with a creative, dynamic sector. I myself would quarrel with the methods but not the goal in this case.

Xi was trying to deleverage the property sector, and that is a huge bubble. Perhaps up to a quarter of Chinese GDP is ultimately based on overvalued property. This is a systemic risk – a systemic disaster in waiting. Certainly, Xi was not wrong for trying to deleverage. We can, again, quarrel about the methods, but suddenly he had to retreat from there as well. Once again, this is a forced retreat because growth began to slow. So what does Xi do? He reaches for the familiar tools that stimulate. But, at core, he is just postponing the problem.

In foreign policy, his record has been a dismal one. Before he took over, China was largely riding high throughout the world. Everyone had some concerns about Tibet and human rights abuses, but by and large the country had a strong image globally. But now I cannot think of any country – including some that are very dependent on China – that does not harbour some concerns about one aspect or another of Chinese behaviour. Canada is a good example. Just before Xi Jinping, the Canadian image of China was generally positive. China was viewed as an opportunity – maybe a bit too hopeful on the political side, but a great opportunity nevertheless. This was a country that was coming out of isolation and playing a major role in the world. Then suddenly… What do they do? They go and kidnap two Canadian citizens on trumped-up charges.

So we all have to deal with China, and we always will. However, I think that there are some fundamental changes at play here on Xi’s watch.

GB: Let’s do a quick tour d’horizon of some other Asian countries post-pandemic, starting with Japan and South Korea, and passing through North Korea.

BK: Japan has come out as well as can be expected. Theirs is a system that very rarely does brilliant things, but very rarely does disastrous things either. It is something of a golden mean. You had a very exceptional leader in Mr. Abe. His foreign policy record was spectacular. He was probably the best foreign policy leader Japan has had since Yoshida, the post-war prime minister. His domestic record was not as great, but respectable enough.
South Korea, for its part, as with all of the Northeast Asian countries, China included, at least in the initial stage, dealt with the pandemic better than most of the West. We can speculate about the reasons for this. They are both cultural and political in nature. It is not necessarily a question of having a superior system, but rather that of different cultural and political instincts and habits. South Korea is very much in that frame. It, like Asia more generally, including some Southeast Asian countries, will come out stronger after the pandemic. Asian countries have, to be sure, been hurt by the pandemic – all of us have been hurt – but we are better prepared than many Western countries. We will come out in better shape.


Courtesy: Global Brief