Published: 05:26 PM, 16 August 2023
Chinese Air Force’s Infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang: Show or Substance
Image courtesy: china-defense.blogspot.com "The author looks at how the increase in Chinese infrastructure in TAR, XAR regions does not materially increase PLAAF’s ability to project force in the same proportion."
The Chinese military leadership has increased the pace of development of Chinese air force (PLAAF) infrastructure in the Tibet and Xinjiang regions. The PLAAF airfields in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) from where it operates its fighter aircraft are of significance to the India front. A few years back, these were also utilised for civil aviation operations. In the preceding years they have either completed, or were in the process of completing three more dual use airfields. In addition to these airfields which cater to wide bodied civil, fighter aircraft, many heliports have been constructed or are under construction.
In the Xinjiang region similarly the PLAAF has a total of 28 airfields of which three are new, 15 have been upgraded and 10 remain as they were. The number of airfields which may be effective against India are three effectively, the others may act as feeder bases. The bases are Hotan, Kashghar and the new base Tashkurgan Khunjerab Airport. As the Tashkurgan has been recently opened in December 2022, its military usage has not been done by the PLAAF as yet.
The numbers to the lay person seem impressive and the Chinese media wants the world to know it, as it is a part of its propaganda messaging of bigger and stronger than what they might be. All these data points are announced by the Chinese media. The effective combat power of the PLAAF is portrayed to be built on infrastructure, capability (platforms and weapons), numbers, training and leadership.
Even as there is infrastructure increase in these regions, it does not materially increase the Chinese ability to project force in the same proportion. The increase in airfields and associated infrastructure such as Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) may only reduce its vulnerabilities and does not eliminate it, to its existing war assets based in them.
Most of the airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang such as the Lhasa-Gonggar, Linzhi-Mainling, Shigatse, Chamdo Bangda, Ngari Gunsa and the three new ones, viz., Lhuntze in Lhokha; Tingri and Burang are at an elevation of 3600 metres and above with the exception being Linzhi, Hotan and Kashghar.
Not all of the PLAAF runways are suitable for fighter or for heavy support operations. The resultant factors affecting PLAAF fighter operations at these altitudes will be both reduced fuel and weapons carriage capacity of the aircraft. In addition, lower acceleration because of altitude and lower deceleration results in longer take off distance and larger landing distance. These in itself cause greater stress on pilot as well as systems such as landing gear and tyres. The second order effect is the need for greater number of sorties for same effect as well as greater requirement of servicing of the aircraft.
The PLAAF can supplement the range of its aircraft by providing mid-air refueling, but this adds significant logistical complexity and exposes tanker aircraft during a conflict. At present it has a limitation of aerial tankers. The harsh and frigid terrain of the Himalayas compounds these issues by making it more challenging to operate and maintain equipment, both in the air and on the ground. The conditions also pose challenges for troops, who require special clothing, equipment, and training to withstand the elements.
The location of some of these airfields also preclude them from use by the PLAAF for fighter and heavy support aircraft. The Chinese airfields close to the LAC themselves become vulnerable to missile attacks and standoff weapons from ground and air-based assets of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Army. Clustering of runways especially in TAR by the Chinese may allow for a concentrated defence but it also provides for a concentrated offence by the IAF.
It has been assessed from open sources that at present four Chinese bases have HAS in them. However, by the lack of dispersion of these in each of the four airfields makes them vulnerable as they have minimal or nil distance between them. However, in all the forward bases of the IAF each has a well-designed HAS and well dispersed. All the tier one airfields on the Indian side are below 500 metres with few exceptions being in Kashmir and only Leh, being at an altitude of over 3000 metres.
The number of airfields on the Indian side are many and have over the years been upgraded. The airfields on the Indian side stretch from Leh in the West to Chabua in the East. The number of airfields is greater and with greater infrastructure than what is available on the Chinese side. The distribution of airfield is evenly spread from the north western to the eastern side of the country. The northern sector has Leh, Thoise, Srinagar, Awantipur, Udhampur, Jammu, Pathankot, Adampur, Chandigarh, Ambala, Hindon, Bareilly, Gorakhpur, Bagdogra, Hasimara, Guwahati and Jorhat. Tezpur and many new Advanced Landing Grounds have been constructed both in Arunachal and in the union territory of Leh.
In addition to these airfields there are an equal number of civil airfields in the vicinity of the established military ones from which military aircraft can operate in times of conflict. The government of India and the Indian Air Force have been cognizant of the requirements of infrastructure to keep the edge on its side and have implemented and planned for more. The PLAAF infrastructure expansion on the other hand is reactive and provides insight on the limitations of the Chinese military leadership’s depth in planning of these projects.
Written by: Tashi Tsering (Views expressed in the article are personal to the author, a postdoctoral researcher in China’s military modernisation, AICIS is neither responsible nor liable for the accuracy, completeness, suitability, or validity of any information in the article.)
>> Source: AICIS
