Arakan Army's Rakhine Quest and the Shape of Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations

The Arakan Army's (AA) "Operation 1113" in Rakhine has produced the greatest battlefield victory since the declaration of war against the Myanmar junta in September 2021, following the breakdown of a 'Nippon Foundation'-mediated interim ceasefire in November of last year.  Over 85% of Rakhine is currently under AA control, including 14 of the total 17 townships.

With the majority of Rakhine now under its control, the AA is poised to realize what its supporters see to as the "Arakan Dream"—a area of Arakan autonomy. The AA has arguably never been this close to gaining potential autonomy in Rakhine. After all is said and done, the AA will probably become the de facto ruling body of Rakhine State, and other actors will need to choose whether and how to interact with it.

In the midst of an international system that, for pragmatic and legal reasons, prioritizes ties with nation-states, the developing situation in Rakhine State presents challenges for surrounding nations and other external players, not the least of which is how to cooperate with a de facto authority such as the AA.

Donors and neighbors will probably discover that the best chance for a beneficial humanitarian and security impact is to collaborate with the de facto administration of Rakhine State to achieve shared objectives while being aware of potential legal and human rights risks and limitations.

The rise of a de facto statelet on its border that wants permanent autonomy compels Dhaka to increase the extent of its cooperation with the AA. Bangladesh's relationship with Myanmar is still strained due to the Rohingyas, also known as "Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN)," who fled to Bangladesh in the 1970s, with the biggest one occurring in 2017. Currently, over a million Rohingya are being housed in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh's foreign policy trajectory under a new interim administration has been the subject of intense debate since Sheikh Hasina's 15 years of uncontested rule came to an end through a popular revolution. The persistent stalemate in enabling the voluntary return of over one million Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, and the geopolitical shift in power and control in Rakhine underscore some of the issues that the new interim government in Bangladesh must solve.

Since the 2021 coup, the junta has been hesitant to engage in meaningful talks with Dhaka over the voluntary return of Rohingyas from Bangladesh. Relations with Bangladesh deteriorated as the junta got more involved in a civil war that was raging throughout the country. Applying sufficient diplomatic pressure to end the crisis was made more difficult by China and India's geopolitical power struggle in Myanmar.  Now that AA is establishing its power in Rakhine, Dhaka's relationship with the AA will be increasingly crucial to the repatriation issue.

A casual relationship with AA will benefit both sides on a number of important topics. It will urge SAC to resume negotiations on the voluntary return of the Rohingyas and issue a warning against inciting the Rohingyas against AA in order to provoke ethnic tensions in Rakhine. Consequently, it will facilitate the development of mutual understanding between Dhaka and AA. Additionally, AA and the state can benefit economically from facilitating informal trade and commerce with Rakhine.

In return, Dhaka may insist that AA make it easier for Rohingya refugees to return home voluntarily. Ensuring secure conditions for Rohingyas within Rakhine and ending AA's purported persecution of them should be prerequisites for this. In addition, Dhaka has the option to use AA to prevent the Kuki Chin National Front, an insurgent organization located in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), from finding any sanctuary. Both AA and Dhaka stand to gain strategically from this kind of facilitation of shared interests. Nevertheless, Dhaka shouldn't completely disregard its ties with the junta, which officially represents Myanmar abroad. As Bangladesh wants to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner. It can also present its problems with Myanmar to ASEAN nations as humanitarian in nature and as a domestic problem that affects Bangladesh.

Bangladesh's neutrality stance encourages a fair approach to global diplomacy, giving it the opportunity to get in touch with AA. Dhaka shouldn't be afraid of junta's reprisal because of this, especially since it is already isolated both internationally and locally. As these claims of domestic meddling in Myanmar's affairs are likely to be "informal ties," the same type of relationship structure that China and India share with AA. It's time for Bangladesh to adjust its foreign policy toward Myanmar after seven years of stalemate over the Rohingya issue.

 
Akib Rahman Shanto is a former student
of Department of International Relations,
University of Dhaka.