India's Hydro-Hegemony and Its Impact on Bangladesh

 The sound of war drums echoing across South Asia following the deadly April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, has once again pushed water-sharing issues into the limelight. India’s decision to suspend the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan, a landmark agreement that had withstood wars and diplomatic breakdowns, has raised questions across the region—especially in Bangladesh. For decades, Bangladesh has faced the consequences of upstream water control, most notably through the Farakka Barrage. As water becomes an increasingly politicized and weaponized tool in South Asia’s geopolitical theatre, Bangladesh finds itself on the precipice of a looming crisis unless immediate, coordinated action is taken.

The Farakka Barrage: A Long-standing Source of Suffering
Operational since 1975, the Farakka Barrage, situated just 18 kilometers upstream from the Bangladesh border in West Bengal, has had a devastating impact on Bangladesh. Over the years, this single structure has altered the hydrological equilibrium of the Ganges-Padma river system, triggering acute dry-season droughts in Bangladesh’s northwestern regions and exacerbating salinity intrusion in the southwestern coastal areas, including the fragile Sundarbans.

The barrage restricts the natural flow of the Ganges into the Padma, Bangladesh’s lifeline. As a result, the dry season (October to May) sees severe water scarcity in Bangladesh’s northwestern regions—Rajshahi, Chapainawabganj, Naogaon, and Pabna—which rely heavily on this flow for agriculture, drinking water, and ecological balance.

According to environmental experts and local data, these areas now face prolonged drought lasting up to eight months a year. Agricultural productivity has plummeted. Crops fail, groundwater is over-extracted, and traditional livelihoods are being eroded. The barrage not only diminishes surface water availability but also affects the underground aquifers due to decreased recharge rates. This has contributed to the internal displacement of the population in those areas and has deepened rural poverty.

Simultaneously, the Sundarbans—one of the world’s largest mangrove forests and a UNESCO World Heritage Site—suffered increased salinity, disrupting biodiversity and threatening the habitat of the endangered Bengal tiger and other species. These challenges are not new. Since the commissioning of the barrage, Bangladesh has experienced reduced dry-season flows in the Padma River, one of its main water arteries.

In South Asia, water politics plays a pivotal role in shaping national security, regional stability, and geopolitical strategies. As freshwater resources become increasingly scarce, countries tend to weaponize water as a strategic tool—particularly upper riparian states, who hold the geographical advantage. These nations often use control over transboundary rivers to exert pressure on downstream neighbors, making them vulnerable during both diplomatic negotiations and regional conflicts. China, for instance, has constructed several dams on the Brahmaputra River (known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet), which originates in Tibet and flows into India and Bangladesh, raising concerns in India about reduced water flow and flash flooding. Similarly, India, as the upper riparian to both Pakistan and Bangladesh, has been criticized for manipulating river flows through structures like the Farakka Barrage and the Teesta Barrage. Such practices highlight how hydropolitics in South Asia is not merely about water management but a critical component of broader power dynamics in the region.

Floods and Unilateral Aggressions
Bangladesh, deprived of fair upstream water releases from its neighbor, has seen its riverbeds silt up, irrigation systems faltered, and soil moisture levels plummeted. A 2024 study estimated that the loss of irrigation water due to Farakka has cost Bangladesh’s agricultural sector, with annual indirect losses exceeding BDT 23 billion approximately.

The Farakka Barrage is not the only example of India’s hydro-hegemony; rather, it is just a sample of the broader irregularity. India has constructed numerous dams and barrages on almost every upstream section of Bangladesh’s transboundary rivers. Out of 54 transboundary rivers between India and Bangladesh, India has built barrages and maintains control over nearly 43 of them.

Apart from the Farakka Barrage, the construction of barrages such as Teesta, Gozaldoba, Manu, Khowai, Mahananda, and the Tipaimukh Dam at strategic upstream points over Bangladesh is a key concern for a country like Bangladesh, whose lifeline depends on its rivers at the grassroots as well as national level.

Occasional opening of the gates of these dams and barrages, and the release of a tremendous volume of water downstream into Bangladesh, often cause unnecessary flooding. What remains deeply undiplomatic is that these releases are made without prior notice or warning; a stark example was the Feni flood in 2024. Beyond Farakka, Teesta and nearly all transboundary rivers flowing into Bangladesh experience severe, recurrent flooding each year—floods that are largely man-made and avoidable.

Lessons from the Indus Waters Treaty Suspension
India’s suspension of the IWT in the context of its deteriorating relationship with Pakistan sets a concerning precedent for transboundary water management in South Asia. While Pakistan is militarily powerful and equipped to respond to such provocations, Bangladesh—smaller and geographically vulnerable—faces greater challenges in asserting its water rights. Besides, the Indian actions surrounding the Indus issue highlight the potential for water to be weaponized, As the country intends dam construction and modifies upstream river systems of Indus, Bangladesh must prepare for a future where its water supply may be held hostage to political will.

The question that arises is urgent; if India can suspend a legally binding international treaty with a nuclear-armed rival like Pakistan, what stops it from doing the same to Bangladesh, with whom no such formal water treaty governs the flow of the Ganges?

The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, though a diplomatic breakthrough at the time, has proved insufficient in addressing Bangladesh’s long-term water security. Moreover, the treaty was a 30-year agreement, valid until 2026. Although it guaranteed minimum flows during critical periods, water levels have often dropped significantly, failing to meet Bangladesh’s needs. The treaty must be renewed with a just approach that respects the river system and addresses the necessities of the people through a sustainable and long-term water-sharing formula.

The Impact on People and Ecosystems

The stakes for Bangladesh could not be higher. Nearly 80% of the country's agriculture is dependent on river-based irrigation. Any disruption in water flow, particularly during the dry season, wreaks havoc on farming schedules, crop yields, and food security. Rural communities reliant on traditional water sources like ponds and canals are left vulnerable; even deep tubewells are no longer yielding water, pushing the country closer to food insecurity and poverty.

Increased salinity due to reduced freshwater flow also accelerates the degradation of coastal ecosystems. The Sundarbans, already under threat from climate change-induced sea level rise, are now facing compounded stress from upstream water mismanagement. Salinity intrusion has reduced fishery productivity, harmed agricultural soil, and increased the incidence of waterborne diseases in nearby communities.

Recommendations for Bangladesh

Despite repeated grievances, Bangladesh’s policymakers have struggled to hold India accountable. The lack of transparency in India’s dam operations and barrage management only adds to the problem.

Civil society voices, including academics and water rights activists, have long warned that Bangladesh must move beyond symbolic diplomacy and adopt a more robust and data-driven approach to water negotiations. Prof. Imtiaz Ahmed of Dhaka University has noted that the Farakka Barrage poses not only a national but a regional humanitarian crisis, affecting communities on both sides of the border.

Given the prevailing pattern of unilateral water actions in South Asia, Bangladesh must urgently adopt comprehensive, multi-pronged strategies to safeguard its water sovereignty:

Strengthen Diplomatic Engagements: Bangladesh must demand an immediate review and revision of the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, as it expires in 2026, with an emphasis on year-round data sharing, equitable flow guarantees, and accountability mechanisms. A renewed treaty must be legally binding, enforceable, and include provisions for the dry season.

Build Strategic Alliances: Just as India has leveraged its geopolitical clout, Bangladesh should work with other lower riparian states to form a coalition advocating for fair water-sharing principles in South Asia. International forums such as the United Nations, BIMSTEC, and the World Bank should be actively engaged.

Invest in National Water Management: Bangladesh must prioritize river dredging, wetland restoration, and rainwater harvesting to reduce dependence on transboundary flows. Diversifying water sources through desalination and groundwater recharge projects can also offer resilience against upstream manipulation. Although reservation cannot be the ultimate solution, yet it helps a lot in a devastating situation like this.

Establish Early Warning Systems: Feni-like incidents show the need for a robust, real-time flood and water release monitoring network. Cross-border data exchange and satellite monitoring can provide critical early warnings to prevent disasters.

Public Awareness and Legal Preparedness: National awareness campaigns should educate citizens on the significance of water diplomacy and the threats of upstream control. Legal experts must also prepare to challenge unilateral upstream actions through international arbitration, using precedents from the Indus case.

Environmental Diplomacy: The ecological cost of river mismanagement must be brought to the global stage. Bangladesh should champion a “Rivers for Peace” initiative, advocating for rivers to be seen not as geopolitical tools but as shared lifelines requiring cooperative stewardship.


Md. Abu Saim has research
interests in international
relations and political economy.