Unmasking Unrest in Chittagong Hill Tracts

 

The history of violence and bloodshed in Bangladesh’s hill regions is long and painful. The recent terrorist incident in Khagrachhari is yet another chapter in that story. During British colonial rule, the Chittagong Hill Tracts were administered as an “Excluded Area,” kept outside the direct control of the colonial government. Local hill chiefs and indigenous communities were granted authority over regional governance. Land ownership and administrative power largely remained within the tribal social system, which helped preserve their social structure and autonomy.

The history of terrorism and killings in Bangladesh’s hill regions is long and tragic. The recent incident in Khagrachhari is part of that ongoing cycle. During the Pakistan era, the Chittagong Hill Tracts continued to face administrative neglect, inequality, and exploitation. Central authority deepened divisions between indigenous groups and Bengalis, maintaining the colonial “divide and rule” approach. This led to land grabbing, bureaucratic oppression, and growing communal tensions laying the groundwork for social unrest and the eventual rise of armed groups. Some of these groups emerged to protect ethnic interests, while others became entangled in politically motivated violence, including murder, abduction, and terrorism.

In the 1960s, the construction of the Kaptai Dam displaced thousands of Chakma and other hill people, many of whom took refuge in India and Myanmar. This mass displacement triggered deep social and economic crises, planting seeds of resentment that endured well into Bangladesh’s independence. After 1971, the first Awami League government sought to establish state control over the region through military deployment, targeting armed opposition and political rivals. As settlements expanded, some innocent Bengali families became collateral victims. Certain political allies and intellectuals at the time justified these actions, while local authorities and media often distorted events further intensifying divisions within the hill communities.

In 1972, the formation of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) brought forward demands for autonomy, land rights, and inclusion in government development programs. Yet conflict persisted. Following the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the onset of military rule, violence in the hills escalated sharply. Political instability, military operations, and collaboration from sections of local leaders resulted in extensive suffering among tribal Bengalis.

Between 1980 and 1992, clashes between the Shanti Bahini and state forces led to the deaths of roughly 400 soldiers and about 30,000 Bengalis. Thousands of families were displaced, and insecurity became entrenched. Allegations also arose against certain human rights activists, left-leaning groups, and India-aligned intellectuals for remaining silent or in some cases, encouraging the unrest complicating the conflict further. Although the 1997 Peace Accord aimed to end the bloodshed, it failed to bring lasting stability. Instead, new administrative divisions, land seizures, and acts of violence persisted. Critics argue that allowing the PCJSS and the splinter group UPDF partial self-governance created governance vacuums and even threatened Bangladesh’s sovereignty.

Post-accord, armed factions expanded their influence over local politics and administration. Extortion, intimidation, and armed takeovers became commonplace, obstructing genuine development. While government policy frequently highlights “uplifting the hill peoples,” the economic hardships of the Bengali population in these regions often remain overlooked.

The three hill districts are home to around 1.4 million people about 59% Bengali and 41% indigenous, though figures vary by source. The lack of justice for thousands of killings has emboldened perpetrators. The Chakma community, relatively advanced in education especially among women in the teaching profession contrasts with lower literacy rates among Bengalis in several areas. Controversy also surrounds land lease and management practices, raising questions of equity and state accountability.

Security analyses suggest that groups like the UPDF operate under foreign influence. In the recent Khagrachhari unrest, allegations emerged that a fabricated rape case was used to provoke violence. Medical reports and early evidence found no proof of sexual assault, but the claim still triggered widespread tension. Such disinformation and geopolitical maneuvering have deepened the crisis.

Security experts now recommend an immediate, coordinated response to dismantle UPDF-linked terrorism. Intelligence-based monitoring must counter cross-border training and disinformation networks. However, a purely military approach is insufficient. Maintaining law and order through evidence-based investigation, public awareness, protection for victims, and initiatives to rebuild social cohesion among hill and Bengali communities are essential. Greater coordination between the military and civil administration is also critical to restore public trust while ensuring safety.

To address renewed instability, proposals have emerged to increase army camps and cantonments in Khagrachhari, potentially up to 250. Since the 1997 Accord, many camps were reduced. Some believe heightened military presence will strengthen security, while others warn it may erode cultural and political rights. Any such decision must therefore balance local perspectives, ground realities, human rights, and international lessons before forming new security policy for the region.

At its core, the crisis in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is shaped by complex geopolitical factors most notably, long-term interference from neighboring states and the volatile politics of border regions. However, framing this conflict solely as an ethnic or religious dispute oversimplifies reality and obscures effective solutions. The issue is fundamentally one of national security, sovereignty, and inclusive policymaking.

The Constitution of Bangladesh does not grant any separate legal identity to the hill region its residents are equal citizens of the Republic. Therefore, resolving the crisis requires an approach that safeguards the collective rights and security of all Bangladeshis, ensuring justice and stability across the entire nation.

The responsibility now rests on both the state and society to not only combat terrorism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts but also to rebuild the region’s social fabric. This requires data-driven, participatory, and equitable policymaking; increased investment in agriculture, forestry, small industries, education, and healthcare to generate employment; empowerment of women and youth through education; strengthened border management; and coordinated strategies with neighboring countries.

At the same time, the rule of law must be upheld through firm but rights-respecting action against groups involved in terrorism and extortion. Lasting peace can only be achieved through political dialogue and locally inclusive processes not through military force alone. True stability depends on social justice, access to justice, and shared development.

In this context, Bangladesh must critically reassess the 1997 Peace Accord. Authorities should either revoke what many view as a sovereignty-compromising agreement or renew it through a comprehensive, evidence-based review. Any revised framework must address the accord’s weaknesses and be grounded in fairness, inclusiveness, and the participation of all communities. The state must act decisively to safeguard public trust, national security, and citizens’ rights exercising power in alignment with constitutional freedoms and human rights.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts are an inseparable part of Bangladesh. All its inhabitants Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and Bengali alike share equal citizenship and constitutional rights. Any divisive rhetoric or policy undermines national unity and sovereignty. Therefore, the state and society must work together to ensure that peace, justice, and development coexist in the hills.

Intelligence agencies have repeatedly warned that insurgent tendencies and separatist movements exist on both sides of the border. Strengthening border surveillance, utilizing intelligence effectively, and fostering international cooperation are crucial to identify and neutralize the root causes of instability in the region.


Dr. M. Abdul Momin is an 
Agricultural Journalist & Senior Communication Officer, Bangladesh
Rice Research Institute (BRRI).