U.S. New Interventionism in Bangladesh and the Question of Sovereignty

 

The recent Washington Post report (titled “U.S. seeks to be ‘friends’ with Bangladesh’s once-banned Islamist party”, published on January 22, 2026) on U.S. outreach to Jamaat-e-Islami is not an isolated diplomatic curiosity. It is a revealing window into a deeper, more systematic strategy: a recalibration of American influence in Bangladesh through selective engagement, strategic ambiguity, and institutional undermining. Such a message, ahead of Bangladesh’s upcoming elections, is deeply concerning for the state.

Together with leaked comments by a U.S. diplomat describing Sheikh Hasina’s conviction as “politically genius” while simultaneously dismissing the judicial process as “not free and fair,” a troubling pattern emerges. Washington appears to be endorsing political outcomes it prefers while hollowing out the legitimacy of domestic institutions that produce them. This is not democracy promotion. It is ‘interest-first’ geopolitics—designed to engineer a pliable political environment aligned with U.S. regional priorities, including strategic access to the Bay of Bengal. To understand the gravity of this moment, we must see these developments not as tactical adjustments but as elements of a coherent doctrine: the reinvention of interventionism for the twenty-first century.

The “Politically Genius” Narrative: Strategic Praise, Institutional Contempt

At the heart of the Washington Post report lies a diplomatic paradox. A senior U.S. official privately described Sheikh Hasina’s conviction as “politically genius”—a striking endorsement of the political outcome—yet publicly questioned the fairness of the tribunal and the integrity of Bangladesh’s judicial process. This cannot be seen as a contradiction; it is calibration.

By praising the political result while undermining the legal mechanism, Washington accomplishes two strategic objectives simultaneously. First, it legitimizes regime change in outcome, reassuring allies and internal bureaucratic stakeholders that U.S. goals are being met. Second, it delegitimizes domestic institutions, ensuring that Bangladesh’s judiciary, election mechanisms, and accountability frameworks remain under perpetual Western “oversight.”

This technique is increasingly central to modern interventionism. Rather than contesting sovereignty directly, global powers now contest institutional legitimacy. If courts are “not free,” elections “not fair,” and governments “not credible,” then external involvement becomes morally justifiable—even necessary. The deeper implication is more unsettling: Bangladesh is being subtly repositioned as a “managed democracy,” where sovereignty is conditional and legitimacy is externally certified.

In this framework, justice is not measured by due process or constitutional adherence, but by geopolitical utility. If the verdict produces a leadership transition aligned with U.S. strategic interests, it is celebrated. If the process strengthens independent state capacity, it is discredited. This duality reflects a broader truth: Washington no longer merely wants cooperative governments—it wants structurally dependent political systems.

Jamaat-e-Islami: From Pariah to Partner

The most explosive dimension of the Washington Post report is the revelation of closed-door U.S. meetings with Jamaat-e-Islami, a party Washington once treated as politically radioactive due to its historical role in 1971 and its ideological alignment with Islamist politics. Why now? The answer is brutal in its simplicity: strategic pragmatism. With the fall of the Awami League government, Washington faced an immediate vacuum. Its long-standing interlocutors within the state apparatus were dislodged. To maintain leverage, it needed new partners—fast. Jamaat, despite its controversial past, offers three strategic advantages:

Organizational Depth: Jamaat possesses one of the most disciplined grassroots networks in Bangladesh. In recent times, its capacity to mobilize street politics makes it an indispensable force in any transitional configuration.

Ideological Flexibility: Despite its Islamist orientation, Jamaat has demonstrated a willingness to recalibrate rhetoric when geopolitical incentives are high.

Strategic Leverage: By engaging Jamaat, Washington gains influence across ideological divides, allowing it to shape coalition-building dynamics from within. It cannot be seen as ideological reconciliation. In reality, it is geopolitical outsourcing.

Washington is effectively signaling that past sins are negotiable, history is malleable, and ideology is secondary—provided the political actor in question can deliver strategic compliance. The danger for Bangladesh is existential. Normalizing Jamaat through Western engagement not only re-legitimizes forces historically opposed to the country’s founding principles but also re-engineers the political spectrum itself. The battlefield is no longer merely electoral; it is civilizational. What emerges is a deeply cynical calculus: democracy becomes a tactical instrument, not a normative commitment.

Saint Martin’s Island and the Bay of Bengal: The Strategic Endgame

Behind diplomatic choreography lies geostrategic reality. Bangladesh’s location is no longer peripheral. In the intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, the Bay of Bengal has become a frontline theater. Control over maritime corridors, surveillance infrastructure, submarine routes, and logistical access points has transformed small territories into strategic assets. Saint Martin’s Island, often framed as an ecological concern or tourism site, sits astride critical maritime lanes connecting South Asia to Southeast Asia.

For Washington, Bangladesh offers three critical strategic dividends:

• Maritime Surveillance Capabilities across the eastern Indian Ocean.
• Logistical Access near China’s southwestern flank.
• Strategic Depth in counterbalancing Chinese port investments in Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

To secure these objectives, Washington requires not just cooperation, but political predictability. Governments that negotiate hard, resist security entanglements, or assert strategic autonomy become liabilities. Hence the push for “friendly” political ecosystems—governments, coalitions, and institutions structurally inclined toward U.S. alignment. Seen through this prism, the outreach to Jamaat and the delegitimization of Bangladesh’s judicial institutions are not contradictory—they are complementary. Together, they soften political resistance, fragment nationalist consensus, and normalize external intervention. This is how sovereignty erodes: not through invasion, but through partnership.

A Global Pattern: Venezuela, Greenland, and the New Imperial Grammar

Bangladesh’s experience is not unique. It is part of a global pattern where Washington increasingly discards diplomatic subtlety in favor of overt strategic assertion. In Venezuela, U.S. agencies openly facilitated operations targeting political leadership, treating regime destabilization as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy. In Greenland, Washington’s territorial assertions—once dismissed as eccentric—now appear as precursors to a more muscular Arctic doctrine. The message is unmistakable: strategic geography overrides diplomatic decorum. In each case, domestic political realities are secondary to U.S. geopolitical imperatives. Institutional sovereignty is tolerated only so long as it aligns with American strategic design.

Bangladesh’s vulnerability lies in its internal fragmentation. Economic fragility, political polarization, and institutional erosion create the ‘perfect conditions’ for external engineering. When domestic consensus collapses, foreign leverage expands. This is the tragedy of small states in great power contests: sovereignty becomes negotiable.

The New Interventionism: Softer, Deeper, More Durable

Unlike the blunt-force interventions of the Cold War or the military invasions of the post-9/11 era, today’s interventionism operates through:

• Diplomatic normalization of controversial actors
• Selective legitimization of political outcomes
• Institutional delegitimization of legal processes
• Strategic civil society engagement
• Economic conditionality

It is less visible, more sophisticated, and far more durable. By embedding itself inside domestic political ecosystems, external power no longer needs overt coercion. Influence becomes systemic. Bangladesh now stands at this dangerous inflection point. The outreach to Jamaat is not merely about political inclusion; it is about reprogramming political incentives. The delegitimization of the judiciary is not about human rights; it is about institutional leverage. This architecture of intervention does not topple governments—it reshapes states.

Bangladesh cannot afford naïveté. Nor can it indulge ideological rigidity. What it requires is strategic maturity. Three imperatives must guide national response:

Institutional Fortification: Judicial independence, electoral integrity, and administrative professionalism must be strengthened—not rhetorically defended. Sovereignty collapses when institutions are weak.

Strategic Non-Alignment: Bangladesh must reassert a multi-vector foreign policy—deepening ties with China, India, ASEAN, the EU, and the Global South—so that no single power monopolizes strategic leverage.

Civilizational Consensus: The foundational values of 1971—pluralism, secularism, cultural autonomy—must remain the moral center of national politics. Without this anchor, geopolitical opportunism will hollow out the state from within.

The Washington Post report is not merely a journalistic scoop. It is a warning flare. Washington’s engagement with Jamaat, coupled with its institutional double-speak, signals a new phase of strategic activism in Bangladesh—one that prioritizes geopolitical alignment over democratic substance. The danger is not overt domination. It is silent absorption into a strategic architecture not of our making. Moreover, an analysis of global political history shows that Islamist groups or parties that have received support from or forged close ties with the United States have rarely met a favorable end.

History offers brutal lessons: nations do not lose sovereignty overnight. They lose it gradually—through compromises justified as pragmatism, alliances framed as necessity, and interventions masked as partnership. Bangladesh stands today at that crossroads. To preserve autonomy, it must cultivate vigilance, strategic coherence, and institutional resilience. Otherwise, it risks becoming yet another minor square on the grand chessboard of great power politics—moved, sacrificed, and forgotten. Therefore, the people of Bangladesh and patriotic political forces must remain vigilant against those who, for temporary gain, are willing to compromise the nation’s sovereignty and allow it to be undermined through the United States’ “new interventionism.”


Emran Emon is an eminent
journalist, columnist and global
affairs analyst. He can be reached at [email protected]