Bicameral parliament could eradicate corruption and bring accountability in Bangladesh’s?

Corruption and weak accountability have long challengedfor Bangladesh’s political and governance systems. Despite constitutionalsafeguards, anti-corruption laws, and periodic reforms, public trust remainsfragile. This raises a difficult but necessary question: is it possible tomeaningfully curb corruption and strengthen accountability by reforming thepolitical structure itself—specifically, by establishing a two-stage(bicameral) parliament?

 

Currently Bangladeshoperates under a unicameral parliamentary system, where a single legislativechamber concentrates law-making, oversight, and political power. While this systemallows efficiency, it can also enable excessive centralization, partisandominance, and weak scrutiny. A two-stage parliament—typically consisting of aLower House and an Upper House—offers an alternative institutional design thatmay improve checks and balances if implemented carefully and democratically.

 

Understandinga Two-Stage Parliament

A two-stage parliament divides legislativeauthority between two chambers with distinct roles. The Lower House usuallyrepresents the people directly through elections and initiates mostlegislation, especially budgetary and financial bills. The Upper House oftenrepresents regions, professional groups, or non-partisan experts and focuses onreview, oversight, and long-term national interests.

 

In theory, this separation reduces the risk ofrushed legislation, partisan capture, and abuse of power. Laws must passthrough two layers of scrutiny, making corruption, favoritism, and opaque dealsharder to hide.

 

How aTwo-Stage Parliament Could Reduce Corruption:

First, enhanced legislative scrutiny is a keyadvantage. In Bangladesh, many controversial laws and amendments have passedwith limited debate. An Upper House with the authority to review, amend, ordelay legislation could demand transparency, conduct public hearings, andrequire stronger justifications for policies. This slows down rent-seekingbehavior and exposes conflicts of interest.

 

Second, institutionalized accountability couldbe strengthened through specialized oversight committees. An Upper Housecomposed partly of retired judges, economists, former civil servants, andrepresentatives from civil society could independently review government actions,public procurement, and regulatory decisions. Such bodies would be lessvulnerable to short-term electoral pressure and party discipline.

 

Third, decentralization of power is crucial.If the Upper House represents divisions or regions, it can reduce Dhaka-centricdecision-making and political patronage networks. Regional representation wouldbring local corruption issues into national debate and make it harder forcentralized elites to monopolize resources.

PoliticalAccountability Beyond Elections:

Elections alone have not been sufficient toensure accountability in Bangladesh. Winner-takes-all politics, weak oppositionparticipation, and confrontational political culture often limit effectiveparliamentary oversight. A two-stage parliament could create structured,continuous accountability mechanisms that operate between elections.

 

For example, ministers could be required toface questioning in both chambers. Independent investigation reports frombodies such as the Anti-Corruption Commission could be mandatorily reviewed bythe Upper House, with follow-up actions made public. This visibility wouldincrease political costs for corrupt behavior.

 

Limitationsand Risks:

However, a two-stage parliament is not a magicsolution. Corruption is rooted not only in institutions but also in politicalculture, enforcement capacity, and social norms. Without genuine politicalwill, a bicameral system could become another layer of patronage, increasingcosts without improving governance.

 

There is also the risk of elite capture. Ifthe Upper House is appointed rather than elected, it may serve ruling interestsinstead of acting as an independent watchdog. Conversely, if it is electedthrough flawed processes, it may replicate the same problems found in the LowerHouse. Therefore, the method of selection is critical. A mixed system—combiningindirect elections, fixed quotas for professionals, and strict non-partisancriteria—could reduce these risks.

Another concern is legislative gridlock. Ifboth chambers are dominated by rival political forces without a culture ofcompromise, policymaking could stall. To avoid this, constitutional clarity onpowers, timelines, and conflict-resolution mechanisms is essential.

 

ComplementaryReforms Are Essential:

A two-stage parliament can only succeed ifaccompanied by broader reforms. Judicial independence must be strengthened socorruption cases are prosecuted fairly and without political interference. TheAnti-Corruption Commission must be autonomous, well-resourced, and accountableto parliament rather than the executive.

 

Political party reforms are equally important.Transparent campaign financing, internal party democracy, and asset disclosureby politicians would reduce incentives for corruption. Digital governance, opendata, and citizen access to information can further support parliamentaryoversight.

 

Is ItPossible?

Yes, it is possible but not guaranteed.Establishing a two-stage parliament in Bangladesh could create strongerinstitutional checks, improve legislative quality, and enhance accountability.However, its success would depend on careful constitutional design, transparentselection of members, and a genuine commitment to democratic norms.

 

Corruption is ultimately a political problem,not just an administrative one. Structural reform like a bicameral parliamentcan open new pathways for accountability, but only if it is part of a broadertransformation toward rule of law, transparency, and civic participation.Without that commitment, no parliamentary structure—one stage or two—caneradicate corruption on its own.