Could Bicameral Parliament Eradicate Corruption and Bring Accountability in Bangladesh?

Corruptionand poor accountability have long challenged for Bangladesh’s political andgovernance systems. In Spite of constitutional safeguards, anti-corruption laws,and periodic reforms, public trust remains fragile. This raises a difficult butnecessary question. Is it possible to meaningfully curb corruption andstrengthen accountability by reforming the political structureitself—specifically, by establishing a bicameral (two-stage) parliament?

Atpresent Bangladesh ruled under an unicameral parliamentary system, where asingle legislative chamber concentrates to law making, oversight, and politicalpower. Despite this system allows efficiency, it can also lead excessivecentralization, partisan dominance, and poor scrutiny. A bicameral parliamenttypically consisting of a Lower House and an Upper House which offers analternative institutional design that may improve checks and balances ifimplemented carefully and democratically.

Theinterim government of Bangladesh has also proposed the formation of a bicameralparliament under the state reform. For this reason, the government hasorganized a referendum along with the 13th national election. According to thebasic principle of a bicameral parliament, there will be a lower house formedby representatives directly elected by the people and an upper house will beformed  by 100 representatives electedproportionally with the consent of all political parties. The question is howsuitable is this system for Bangladesh?

ABicameral parliament divides legislative authority between two chambers withdistinct roles. The Lower House usually represents the people directly throughelections and initiates most legislation, especially budgetary and financialbills. The Upper House often represents non-partisan experts or professionalgroups and focuses on review, oversight, and long-term national interests. Thisseparation reduces the risk of rushed legislation, partisan capture, and abuseof power. Laws must pass through two layers of scrutiny, making corruption,favoritism, and opaque deals harder to hide.

How Bicameral parliament couldreduce corruption:

First,enhanced legislative scrutiny is a key advantage. In Bangladesh, manycontroversial laws and amendments have passed with limited debate. An UpperHouse with the authority to review, amend, or delay legislation could demandtransparency, conduct public hearings, and require stronger justifications forpolicies. This slows down rent-seeking behavior and exposes conflicts ofinterest. Second, institutionalized accountability could be strengthenedthrough specialized oversight committees. An Upper House composed partly ofretired judges, economists, former civil servants, and representatives fromcivil society could independently review government actions, publicprocurement, and regulatory decisions. Such bodies would be less vulnerable toshort-term electoral pressure and party discipline.Third, decentralization ofpower is crucial. If the Upper House represents divisions or regions, it canreduce Dhaka-centric decision-making and political patronage networks. Regionalrepresentation would bring local corruption issues into national debate andmake it harder for centralized elites to monopolize resources.

Political accountability beyond elections:

Electionsalone have not been sufficient to ensure accountability in Bangladesh. All winnerpolitical parties, weak opposition participation, and confrontational politicalculture often limit effective parliamentary oversight. A Bicameral parliamentcould create structured, continuous accountability mechanisms that operatebetween elections.

Forexample, ministers could be obligated to answer questions in both chambers ofparliament. Reports from independent bodies such as the Anti-CorruptionCommission could be formally examined by the Upper House, with subsequentactions disclosed to the public. Such transparency would raise the politicalconsequences of engaging in corrupt practices.

Risks and Limitations of bicameral parliament:

However,a Bicameral parliament is not a magic solution. Corruption is rooted not onlyin institutions but also in political culture, enforcement capacity, and socialnorms. Without genuine political will, a bicameral system could become anotherlayer of patronage, increasing costs without improving governance.

Thereis also the risk of elite capture. If the Upper House is appointed rather thanelected, it may serve ruling interests instead of acting as an independentwatchdog. Conversely, if it is elected through flawed processes, it mayreplicate the same problems found in the Lower House. Therefore, the method ofselection is critical. A mixed system—combining indirect elections, fixedquotas for professionals, and strict non-partisan criteria—could reduce theserisks.

Anotherconcern is legislative gridlock. If both chambers are dominated by rivalpolitical forces without a culture of compromise, policymaking could stall. Toavoid this, constitutional clarity on powers, timelines, andconflict-resolution mechanisms is essential.

Complementary Reforms are essentialfor Bicameral System:

A Bicameralparliament can only succeed if accompanied by broader reforms. Judicialindependence must be strengthened so corruption cases are prosecuted fairly andwithout political interference. The Anti-Corruption Commission must beautonomous, well-resourced, and accountable to parliament rather than theexecutive.

Politicalparty reforms are equally important. Transparent campaign financing, internalparty democracy and asset disclosure by politicians would reduce incentives forcorruption. Digital governance, open data, and citizen access to informationcan further support parliamentary oversight.

Ifanyone asks that, is It possible? I will say, yes, it is possible but notguaranteed. Establishing a Bicameral parliament in Bangladesh could createstronger institutional checks, improve legislative quality, and enhanceaccountability. However, its success would depend on careful constitutionaldesign, transparent selection of members, and a genuine commitment todemocratic norms.

In Bangladesh,corruption is ultimately a political problem, not just an administrative one.Structural reform like a bicameral parliament can open new pathways foraccountability, but only if it is part of a broader transformation toward ruleof law, transparency, and civic participation. Without that commitment, noparliamentary structure-Bicameral or unicameral eradicate corruption on itsown.

Md. Al-Amin Chowdhury is Head ofStrategic Development and Operations in The Asian Age. He is also thenewspaper’s Publisher.