Published: 03:49 PM, 27 February 2026
The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)-Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Nexus Under Pakistan's Patronage Anna Mahjar-Barducci
ISKP Balochistan coordinator, Mir Shafiq Mengal, gifting a pistol to Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Rana Mohammad Ashfaq, confirming their collaboration. (Source: Wion)
The arrest of Mehmet Gören, a senior operative of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), by the Turkish intelligence organization Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT) near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in late December 2025 has once again drawn attention to persistent allegations that Pakistan provides sanctuary and operational space to terrorist networks active in South and Central Asia.
This development coincides with the emergence of a classified Indian dossier that details what it describes as a covert and expanding partnership between ISKP and the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). According to the dossier, this collaboration has been orchestrated and sustained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
LeT, a United Nations-designated terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has long been assessed by security analysts as benefiting from financial, logistical, and operational backing from the ISI. In parallel, evidence pointing to Pakistan's links with ISKP has steadily accumulated over the last years.
In April 2024, Afghan authorities detained several Tajik nationals who reportedly admitted they had been instructed to travel to Quetta, Pakistan, for training prior to deployment to regional conflict zones. Additional corroboration has emerged from captured ISKP operatives. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, a founding member of the group, stated in a recorded video that ISI officers facilitated financial assistance to Hafiz Saeed Khan, a Pakistan-born militant who served as ISKP's emir until his death in July 2016. Similarly, the 2020 arrest of ISKP leader Aslam Farooqi – also a Pakistani national – by Afghan forces exposed further ISI connections. Reflecting on these revelations, a senior Afghan official remarked that "ISKP is essentially a demon child of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence."
Claims of institutional support have also surfaced in international forums. During a United Nations meeting in March 2024, Baloch National Movement Chairman Dr. Naseem Baloch asserted that ISIS camps operating in Balochistan function under the supervision of the Pakistani military.
More recently, attention has focused on a photo that has circulated among intelligence circles. The image reportedly shows Mir Shafiq Mengal, ISKP's coordinator in Balochistan, handing a pistol to Rana Mohammad Ashfaq, a senior commander of LeT. Intelligence sources interpret the photo as symbolic of the formalization of operational cooperation between the two groups – an alliance they describe as having been crafted under the direct oversight of the ISI.
According to the Indian dossier, the ISKP-LeT partnership advances several of Pakistan's strategic objectives. At the domestic level, it is designed to suppress Baloch separatist movements, while at the regional level it is intended to counter what Islamabad views as "anti-Pakistan elements" within Afghanistan's Taliban leadership. Despite its ideological rigidity, the Taliban is no longer a compliant client of Pakistan; Kabul's rulers increasingly behave as nationalists first and Islamists second, asserting strategic autonomy in ways that underscore Islamabad's diminishing influence. Externally, the ISKP-LeT alliance is also seen as a means of sustaining armed pressure on India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.
Central to this network is Mir Shafiq Mengal, who has long been linked to the ISI. Widely accused of operating a private militia responsible for targeting Baloch nationalist leaders, Mengal reportedly emerged around 2015 as a key facilitator for ISKP. His alleged role included arranging funding, weapons transfers, and safe houses. Media reports indicate that, with ISI backing, he established ISKP facilities in the Balochistan districts of Mastung and Khuzdar – sites reportedly used both to suppress Baloch resistance and to launch attacks into Afghanistan.
Following the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, Pakistan's intelligence services are said to have restructured ISKP's operational footprint in Balochistan. This effort suffered a significant setback in March 2025, when Baloch armed groups overran ISKP's Mastung base, killing approximately 30 terrorists. In the wake of this loss, the ISI reportedly turned to LeT to offset depleted manpower and infrastructure. By June 2025, LeT chief Rana Mohammad Ashfaq and his deputy, Saifullah Kasuri, had convened a meeting in Balochistan, during which they pledged armed struggle against what they labeled "anti-Pakistan" forces.
Security analysts warn that the growing ISKP-LeT alignment marks a dangerous evolution in Pakistan's proxy warfare strategy, one that threatens to further destabilize Balochistan and Afghanistan while also risking a renewed cycle of violence in Kashmir. This strategic shift is increasingly reflected in ISKP's own messaging. Observers have pointed to a notable change in the group's propaganda output, particularly in its magazine Yalgaar, which has adopted more explicit rhetoric signaling ambitions to expand operations into the Kashmir Valley. Indian analysts contend that this shift goes beyond ideological posturing, indicating a deliberate recalibration of ISKP's narrative to align more closely with Pakistan's regional objectives.
In the broader South Asian security landscape, ISKP's expanding operational reach – combined with its declared hostility toward U.S. interests – poses a challenge Washington cannot afford to ignore. The existence of permissive environments within Pakistan affords the group strategic depth, operational resilience, and access to wider recruitment networks. Yet despite these concerns, Pakistan retains its designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally, a status conferring substantial defense and security privileges. As militant infrastructures remain intact, Pakistan increasingly appears less as a reliable counterterrorism partner and more as a destabilizing factor within the regional threat matrix – raising serious questions about the long-term viability of its preferential treatment.
Written by: Anna Mahjar-Barducci (The author is is a MEMRI Senior Research Fellow.)
>> Source: Memri.org
This development coincides with the emergence of a classified Indian dossier that details what it describes as a covert and expanding partnership between ISKP and the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). According to the dossier, this collaboration has been orchestrated and sustained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
LeT, a United Nations-designated terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has long been assessed by security analysts as benefiting from financial, logistical, and operational backing from the ISI. In parallel, evidence pointing to Pakistan's links with ISKP has steadily accumulated over the last years.
In April 2024, Afghan authorities detained several Tajik nationals who reportedly admitted they had been instructed to travel to Quetta, Pakistan, for training prior to deployment to regional conflict zones. Additional corroboration has emerged from captured ISKP operatives. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, a founding member of the group, stated in a recorded video that ISI officers facilitated financial assistance to Hafiz Saeed Khan, a Pakistan-born militant who served as ISKP's emir until his death in July 2016. Similarly, the 2020 arrest of ISKP leader Aslam Farooqi – also a Pakistani national – by Afghan forces exposed further ISI connections. Reflecting on these revelations, a senior Afghan official remarked that "ISKP is essentially a demon child of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence."
Claims of institutional support have also surfaced in international forums. During a United Nations meeting in March 2024, Baloch National Movement Chairman Dr. Naseem Baloch asserted that ISIS camps operating in Balochistan function under the supervision of the Pakistani military.
More recently, attention has focused on a photo that has circulated among intelligence circles. The image reportedly shows Mir Shafiq Mengal, ISKP's coordinator in Balochistan, handing a pistol to Rana Mohammad Ashfaq, a senior commander of LeT. Intelligence sources interpret the photo as symbolic of the formalization of operational cooperation between the two groups – an alliance they describe as having been crafted under the direct oversight of the ISI.
According to the Indian dossier, the ISKP-LeT partnership advances several of Pakistan's strategic objectives. At the domestic level, it is designed to suppress Baloch separatist movements, while at the regional level it is intended to counter what Islamabad views as "anti-Pakistan elements" within Afghanistan's Taliban leadership. Despite its ideological rigidity, the Taliban is no longer a compliant client of Pakistan; Kabul's rulers increasingly behave as nationalists first and Islamists second, asserting strategic autonomy in ways that underscore Islamabad's diminishing influence. Externally, the ISKP-LeT alliance is also seen as a means of sustaining armed pressure on India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.
Central to this network is Mir Shafiq Mengal, who has long been linked to the ISI. Widely accused of operating a private militia responsible for targeting Baloch nationalist leaders, Mengal reportedly emerged around 2015 as a key facilitator for ISKP. His alleged role included arranging funding, weapons transfers, and safe houses. Media reports indicate that, with ISI backing, he established ISKP facilities in the Balochistan districts of Mastung and Khuzdar – sites reportedly used both to suppress Baloch resistance and to launch attacks into Afghanistan.
Following the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, Pakistan's intelligence services are said to have restructured ISKP's operational footprint in Balochistan. This effort suffered a significant setback in March 2025, when Baloch armed groups overran ISKP's Mastung base, killing approximately 30 terrorists. In the wake of this loss, the ISI reportedly turned to LeT to offset depleted manpower and infrastructure. By June 2025, LeT chief Rana Mohammad Ashfaq and his deputy, Saifullah Kasuri, had convened a meeting in Balochistan, during which they pledged armed struggle against what they labeled "anti-Pakistan" forces.
Security analysts warn that the growing ISKP-LeT alignment marks a dangerous evolution in Pakistan's proxy warfare strategy, one that threatens to further destabilize Balochistan and Afghanistan while also risking a renewed cycle of violence in Kashmir. This strategic shift is increasingly reflected in ISKP's own messaging. Observers have pointed to a notable change in the group's propaganda output, particularly in its magazine Yalgaar, which has adopted more explicit rhetoric signaling ambitions to expand operations into the Kashmir Valley. Indian analysts contend that this shift goes beyond ideological posturing, indicating a deliberate recalibration of ISKP's narrative to align more closely with Pakistan's regional objectives.
In the broader South Asian security landscape, ISKP's expanding operational reach – combined with its declared hostility toward U.S. interests – poses a challenge Washington cannot afford to ignore. The existence of permissive environments within Pakistan affords the group strategic depth, operational resilience, and access to wider recruitment networks. Yet despite these concerns, Pakistan retains its designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally, a status conferring substantial defense and security privileges. As militant infrastructures remain intact, Pakistan increasingly appears less as a reliable counterterrorism partner and more as a destabilizing factor within the regional threat matrix – raising serious questions about the long-term viability of its preferential treatment.
Written by: Anna Mahjar-Barducci (The author is is a MEMRI Senior Research Fellow.)
>> Source: Memri.org
