Published: 12:34 AM, 14 May 2026
BJP’s Victory Celebrations: A Moment of Recalculation for Bangladesh
Asif Showkat Kallol
The sweeping victory of the BJP in the West Bengal assembly elections, ending over a decade and a half of Trinamool Congress rule, is not merely a political earthquake within India—it has also triggered a complex set of political and strategic recalculations for neighboring Bangladesh. As celebrations erupt across BJP ranks, Dhaka watches with a mix of concern and reluctant curiosity, trying to decode what this “new Bengal” truly means.
Leaders like Suvendu Adhikari have wasted little time in offering a rather blunt electoral analysis: Hindus voted for the BJP, Muslims for the opposition. While such reductionist arithmetic may be convenient for victory speeches, it sits uncomfortably with the idea of a modern democracy. More importantly, it signals cracks in Bengal’s long-cherished secular identity—an identity once proudly exported as a model for others, including sections of Bangladesh’s own elite. Earlier, Suvendu Adhikari claimed that former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (now hiding in New Delhi) would return to Dhaka with honour, while the interim government’s chief adviser would face punishment for his misdeeds.
There was a time when the saying went, “What Bengal thinks today, India thinks tomorrow.” Today, however, one might ask—what exactly is Bengal thinking? The image of a progressive, enlightened Bengal now appears to be under revision, if not outright demolition.
Equally troubling are reports that around 9.1 million voters—roughly 12 percent of the electorate—were excluded from the voter rolls. Officially described as routine “cleanup,” the scale raises eyebrows. Critics suggest that this exercise resembles a smaller, more politically convenient version of Assam’s NRC—only this time with a familiar scapegoat: alleged “illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh. For many in Bangladesh, this narrative does not just sound familiar; it sounds ominous.
The BJP’s electoral rhetoric has made no secret of its intentions. Promises of reinforcing border fences and “pushing in” so-called illegal Muslims into Bangladesh have been delivered with theatrical confidence. Yet one wonders—if the “push-in game” truly begins, what happens to the countless Indian citizens who cross into Bangladesh daily for work and trade? Or is cross-border mobility only problematic when it suits a political script?
Post-election developments have further heightened concerns. Reports of violence against Muslims, including deaths and the bulldozing of beef shops in Kolkata, have circulated widely. Such spectacles of “law enforcement” may win applause in certain quarters, but they also risk provoking reactions across the border. After all, communal tension rarely respects geopolitical boundaries.
From Bangladesh’s perspective, it is difficult to identify any immediate positives in this victory. When rhetoric from both the central and state levels in India increasingly frames Bangladesh as a problem to be managed, rather than a partner to be engaged, optimism becomes a scarce commodity.
Unsurprisingly, the reaction within Bangladesh has been sharp. Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s recent warning—that any “push-in” attempt would be met with reciprocal measures—marks a notable shift in tone. Not long ago, Dhaka-Delhi relations were described in near-romantic terms. Now, even before the new government in West Bengal has formally settled in, the language has turned distinctly less affectionate.
This shift also coincides with Bangladesh’s visible diplomatic pivot toward China, suggesting that geopolitical balancing may soon become more pronounced. If Delhi’s strategy is to tighten the circle, Dhaka appears ready to redraw its own map.
Ironically, the BJP had long blamed Mamata Banerjee for blocking the Teesta water-sharing agreement. With the party now in power in West Bengal, that excuse has conveniently expired. Yet few in Bangladesh are holding their breath. Given India’s firm stance on border security, transit, and northeastern connectivity, expectations remain low.
Geographically, Bangladesh now finds itself encircled on three sides by BJP-ruled regions—West Bengal to the west, Assam and Meghalaya to the north, and Tripura to the east. While maps may not change overnight, the political climate certainly has, and not necessarily in ways that inspire comfort.
Culturally and socially, this shift may also deepen a sense of defensive identity within Bangladesh’s Muslim-majority society. The longstanding effort to maintain linguistic and cultural distinctiveness could now merge with a renewed emphasis on political and religious identity—perhaps echoing earlier strands of Bangladeshi nationalism.
At the border, the potential for tension is real. On one side, the rise of Hindu nationalist politics; on the other, the presence of Islamist groups in parts of Bangladesh. When two forms of extremism stare at each other across a barbed wire fence, stability becomes a fragile proposition.
India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri has spoken of reviving over 40 bilateral mechanisms to strengthen ties. Such assurances are welcome, but they must contend with a political reality shaped by electoral narratives, populist rhetoric, and what might politely be called “creative nationalism.”
In the end, West Bengal is no longer just a neighboring state. It has become a critical variable in Bangladesh’s internal security, cultural identity, and water politics—a complex maze where each step requires careful calculation.
With the fall of Mamata’s “blue fortress” and the BJP’s triumphant march across what it frames as “Anga, Banga, Kalinga,” the celebrations may be loud—but for Bangladesh, they mark a moment of unease, and a pressing need to recalculate.
Asif Showkat Kallol is Head of
News at Mirror Asia. Views
expressed in the article are the
writer’s personal opinions.
