Indians are furious at the deference with which President Donald Trump treats Pakistan. The U.S. President has systematically shredded a quarter century effort to build a U.S.-India partnership. Rather than hold Pakistan to account for its protection of Osama Bin Laden, its sponsorship of the Taliban and the humiliation its double-dealing delivered to the United States, Trump honours Field Marshal Asim Munir, an unapologetic terror apologist with both American and Indian blood on his hands.
Trump’s turn to Islamabad to mediate matters of war and peace places Pakistan on a pedestal. Whereas he criticized Pakistan’s “lies and deceit” during his first term, now he gushes about Pakistanis as “brilliant people.” After dumping Oman and Qatar as mediators of choice, Trump praised Pakistan as “terrific.”
Pakistani authorities likely believe they can leverage their role as mediator into strategic advantage. Perhaps they believe Trump will sell them military technology to erode India’s qualitative and quantitative military advantage, or perhaps Munir believes he can trick Trump into “mediating” on Kashmir to Pakistan’s advantage. Trump’s earlier reference to India and Pakistan’s thousand-year dispute over Kashmir confirms the U.S. President is no student of history. While Pakistani officials believe they can take advantage of the President’s ignorance, it appears Munir is as ignorant of history as the U.S. President. While Munir celebrates outmanoeuvring Trump, he forgets the unhappy history of U.S.-Pakistan ties.
Pakistanis have long complained that the United States is a fair-weather friend. American leaders are deferential to Islamabad when Washington needs Pakistani assistance, but the White House shows little loyalty to Pakistan. Indeed, the moment U.S. Presidents get what they want, they slam the door on Pakistan. True, the United States and Pakistan were Cold War allies but for Washington, Pakistan was the second choice. President Harry S. Truman wanted to ally with India. Shortly after independence, Truman invited Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Washington; he made no corollary offer to Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan for almost a year after. Pakistan leaders demanded the U.S. treat India and Pakistan equally but, for realists in Washington, this was akin to a cockroach demanding to be treated like a tiger. India was more than four times Pakistan’s size in both area and population. It was also far more formidable militarily, having defeated Pakistan in the 1947-1948 war. Simply put, in the context of the Cold War, Truman wanted India on the U.S. team. U.S. officials turned to Pakistan only after Nehru chose nonalignment.
While the United States and Pakistan paid lip service to their Cold War alliance, most Americans and Pakistanis realized the marriage was always a sham. The United States and Pakistan never shared a common goal: America sought to stop if not roll back Soviet expansion; Pakistan was more obsessed with India. Pakistani officials had a unique ability not only to start every single war with India, but to convince themselves and Pakistani society after they lost that Pakistan was the victim from the start. Neither President Lyndon Johnson nor Richard Nixon believed the Pakistani narrative and so the United States never really considered mobilizing to help Pakistan against India, as Pakistani authorities demanded. This was true even under National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger whose animosity toward Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was unhinged.
On an objective basis, Pakistan is a criminal state. Even though nominally an ally, the United States has repeatedly sanctioned Pakistan over the past 50 years. In 1976, the Symington Amendment prohibited most military sales to Pakistan due to its clandestine nuclear program and, in 1977, Senator John Glenn introduced an amendment to sanction non-nuclearweapon states that detonate a nuclear explosive device. President Ronald Reagan waived both the Symington sanctions and similar penalties under the 1985 Pressler amendment to enable Pakistan to arm Afghanistan’s Mujahideen. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, though, Pakistan was no longer so important, and the sanctions creeped back. After Pakistan detonated its nuclear weapon in 1998, Glenn Amendment sanctions came into force. They remained on Pakistan until 2001, when President George W. Bush waived sanctions to again get Pakistani cooperation on Afghanistan. With U.S. forces no longer in Afghanistan, the strategic need for Pakistan has again disappeared.
This is the lesson Munir fails to remember. Perhaps he believes he can fool Trump into extending the strategic need for Pakistan, but he forgets that whatever favour he believes Pakistan can accrue from America is meaningless for a simple reason: The United States uses Pakistan and then turns its back on the country as soon as Washington no longer needs its assistance. From a Washington perspective, Pakistan is not a woman to marry, but rather a whore to use and discard. Munir is just the latest pimp. Trump’s term is ending and whoever comes next—Republican or Democrat—will likely agree on one issue: Pakistan is not to be trusted, nor will the United States feel any obligation to respect any Trump promises to Munir. Pakistan may believe it is playing Trump for a fool, but the opposite may be true. Pakistan will never collect on Trump promises. (by, Michael Rubin)
>> Source: AEI
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