Published: 12:02 AM, 20 May 2026
Our Rivers Must Flow: The Geopolitics of Survival
Mirajul Islam
The news that the Bangladesh government is seeking Chinese cooperation for the “Teesta Mega Project” appears to be a timely and strategically significant decision.
At the same time, renewed discussions surrounding the long-conceived Padma Barrage project, first envisioned during the East Pakistan era in the 60’s, indicate a growing recognition that Bangladesh must secure greater control over its own water future. If implemented successfully, the Padma Barrage could provide irrigation support to nearly twenty-eight districts during the dry season, substantially reducing the country’s dependence on the Farakka Barrage and upstream water releases from India.
India will naturally view such initiatives through a geopolitical lens and may interpret external involvement, particularly from China, as a strategic challenge within South Asia.
This reaction is not unexpected; it reflects the broader realities of regional geopolitics where control over transboundary rivers often translates into political and economic leverage. Those who closely follow global strategic trends understand that water resources are rapidly emerging as one of the defining geopolitical issues of the twenty-first century.
In many respects, access to freshwater may become even more consequential than conventional military power. Future conflicts, whether regional or global, are likely to be deeply connected to water security, climate stress, and resource distribution.
History repeatedly demonstrates the centrality of water in determining the rise and fall of civilizations and the outcomes of wars.
In ancient conflicts, especially in arid and semi-arid regions, the side that secured access to rivers, reservoirs, and potable water often prevailed. Many military defeats throughout history were ultimately consequences of water scarcity rather than battlefield inferiority alone.
For more than five decades, Bangladesh has consistently sought an equitable share of transboundary river waters from India, yet meaningful progress has remained limited.
Even attempts to internationalize these concerns through diplomatic and legal channels have yielded little structural change. Although there were periods during the Awami League government when water flow from Farakka marginally improved, the West Bengal state government frequently expressed concerns regarding flooding and domestic water management, leading to recurring delays and hesitations.
At the same time, India’s own growing water demands during the dry season have made regional water-sharing increasingly difficult. From the Bangladeshi perspective, this persistent imbalance has contributed significantly to public frustration and has gradually evolved into one of the key drivers of anti-India sentiment within sections of society.
Geography has undeniably shaped this asymmetry.
Since the origins of most major rivers flowing into Bangladesh lie within Indian territory, India has historically enjoyed a strong upstream advantage in negotiations over water distribution.
In practice, international river laws and norms have often remained secondary to geopolitical realities and the limitations of Bangladesh’s diplomatic leverage over the past fifty years.
Historical precedents further illustrate how water politics has shaped international relations across civilizations.
Around 2500 BCE, the Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma negotiated one of the earliest recorded water agreements over tributaries of the Tigris River.
Thousands of years later, Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project dramatically altered the hydro-politics of the Euphrates basin, raising concerns in Syria and Iraq over long-term water scarcity and agricultural decline.
Similarly, the 1967 conflict involving Israel, Syria, and Jordan was influenced in part by disputes over the Jordan and Yarmouk river systems — an example often described by scholars as an early “water conflict.” Across Africa, rivers such as the Nile, Congo, and Niger flow through multiple nations, creating complex regional negotiations over access and control.
In contrast, Europe’s Danube River is frequently cited as a model of cooperative water governance. Despite flowing through nineteen countries, it has largely avoided major interstate disputes due to strong institutional frameworks and mutual political understanding.
Against this backdrop, the India–Bangladesh water-sharing relationship remains particularly striking.
Despite sharing deep civilizational, cultural, and historical ties, the management of the Ganges basin and associated rivers continues to generate tension and mistrust.
Beyond Farakka, even relatively smaller rivers illustrate the broader structural imbalance. The Atrai River, for instance, originates in the Siliguri region of India before flowing through parts of Bangladesh, briefly re-entering India, and eventually returning to Bangladesh’s Barind tract and Chalan Beel region before merging with the Padma.
Local farmers in Bangladesh have relied on small-scale infrastructure, including rubber dams in the Dinajpur region, to sustain irrigation during dry seasons.
However, concerns from the Indian side, including claims that such measures reduce downstream flow within West Bengal have occasionally triggered political objections and movements such as the “Save Atrai” campaign.
For many Bangladeshis, rivers are not merely geographical entities; they are inseparable from cultural memory, agriculture, ecology, and national identity. Yet as a downstream country, Bangladesh often finds itself structurally vulnerable within regional water politics.
From this perspective, the Teesta Project and the Padma Barrage represent more than infrastructure initiatives. They symbolize an effort toward long-term water security, agricultural sustainability, and strategic autonomy.
If China is prepared to support these projects financially and technically, Bangladesh may view such cooperation as an opportunity to accelerate critical national infrastructure that successive governments have struggled to implement.
Should these initiatives ultimately succeed, they could be remembered not only as major engineering achievements, but also as transformative geopolitical decisions aimed at safeguarding Bangladesh’s long-term national interests beyond the constraints of regional dependency.
If the current Bangladesh Nationalist Party government can successfully implement these projects, the credit will undoubtedly go to them and remain a significant reference point for the future.
Mirajul Islam is a physician, columnist, author and research
educator with a master’s graduate
in education from the
University of Minnesota, USA.
