Water is not merely a natural resource. For a riverine nation like Bangladesh, it is a question of survival, sovereignty, food security, ecology and human dignity. The rivers that flow through Bangladesh are the lifeblood of its agriculture, economy, culture and civilization. Yet, for decades, the country has found itself at the receiving end of increasingly unequal and often unilateral decisions taken upstream by India.
Recent remarks by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Member of Parliament (MP) Nishikant Dubey have once again exposed the mindset that continues to dominate sections of India’s political establishment regarding transboundary rivers. On May 30, Dubey publicly criticized the India-Bangladesh water-sharing arrangements, arguing that New Delhi’s commitments harm the interests of Indian farmers and border states. While every country has a legitimate right to protect the interests of its citizens, such arguments become problematic when they completely ignore the rights and vulnerabilities of downstream nations.
The comments are significant not because they represent official Indian policy, but because they reveal an increasingly assertive nationalist narrative that views shared rivers primarily through a domestic political lens rather than as common natural systems requiring cooperation and mutual respect.
Bangladesh should not dismiss such rhetoric as mere political posturing. It reflects a deeper challenge confronting South Asia’s transboundary water governance: the growing tendency of upstream powers to prioritize unilateral advantage over equitable river management.
Geography Is Not a Crime
Bangladesh occupies a unique geographical position. More than fifty transboundary rivers flow into the country from India. These rivers originate largely outside Bangladesh’s territory, making the nation heavily dependent on upstream decisions.
Geography has placed Bangladesh downstream. But geography should not become a justification for deprivation. International water law rests on the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Rivers that cross borders are not the exclusive property of any single nation. They are shared ecosystems that require shared responsibilities.
Yet, Bangladesh has repeatedly experienced the consequences of policies that appear inconsistent with these principles. From the diversion of water at Farakka to prolonged delays in concluding the Teesta agreement, Dhaka has often encountered a pattern in which political considerations within India outweigh the legitimate concerns of downstream communities.
The result has been a growing imbalance in river governance, where Bangladesh frequently bears environmental and economic costs while possessing limited influence over decisions made upstream.
The Human Cost of Upstream Control
The debate over water sharing is not merely diplomatic. It is deeply human. When upstream water flow declines, the consequences are immediate and devastating. Farmers struggle to irrigate crops. Fisheries suffer. River navigation becomes difficult. Groundwater extraction increases. Biodiversity deteriorates.
Reduced freshwater flow also contributes to salinity intrusion in coastal regions. Millions of people in southwestern Bangladesh have already witnessed the gradual transformation of agricultural land, drinking water sources, and local ecosystems due to rising salinity. Riverbank erosion, changing sediment patterns, and ecological degradation further threaten livelihoods.
These are not theoretical concerns. They are realities experienced daily by communities whose futures depend on healthy river systems. What makes the situation particularly troubling is that Bangladesh contributes little to creating these vulnerabilities. Most of the major interventions affecting river flow occur upstream.
When political leaders in India frame water-sharing agreements as sacrifices made for Bangladesh, they overlook the immense sacrifices already being made by downstream populations.
The Dangerous Rise of Hydro-Nationalism
Around the world, water is increasingly becoming a strategic asset. Climate change, population growth, urbanization, and rising agricultural demand have intensified competition over freshwater resources. In this context, a new phenomenon has emerged: hydro-nationalism.
Hydro-nationalism occurs when water resources are treated primarily as instruments of national power rather than shared ecological systems. The rhetoric surrounding transboundary rivers in South Asia increasingly reflects this tendency.
Instead of emphasizing cooperation, some political actors frame river management as a zero-sum contest in which gains for one country necessarily mean losses for another. Such thinking is shortsighted.
Rivers do not recognize political boundaries. Environmental degradation in one part of a basin eventually affects all countries connected to it. The future of South Asia’s water security depends not on domination but on cooperation.
Unfortunately, recent political discourse suggests that sections of India’s leadership are moving toward a more assertive approach that prioritizes unilateral control over basin-wide sustainability.
For a country that often presents itself as a responsible regional power, this trend raises serious questions. True leadership is measured not by the ability to impose one’s will but by the capacity to build trust among neighbors.
The Ganges Treaty at a Crossroads
The upcoming discussions surrounding the future of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty will be a crucial test of regional diplomacy. The treaty, signed in 1996, was widely welcomed as a breakthrough in bilateral cooperation. It demonstrated that difficult water disputes could be addressed through negotiation rather than confrontation.
However, circumstances have changed significantly over the past three decades. Climate variability has increased. Water demand has grown. River ecosystems have become more fragile. Population pressures have intensified. As negotiations regarding future arrangements continue, Bangladesh must approach the process with clarity, confidence and strategic foresight.
The objective should not merely be the preservation of existing mechanisms but the creation of a more equitable and scientifically grounded framework capable of addressing contemporary challenges. Future agreements must include stronger provisions for transparency, data sharing, environmental sustainability and dispute resolution. Most importantly, they must recognize the rights and needs of downstream populations.
What Bangladesh Must Do
Bangladesh cannot afford to approach transboundary water issues through reactive diplomacy alone. A comprehensive national strategy is required.
First, Dhaka must strengthen its scientific and technical capacity. Negotiations should be supported by robust hydrological data, climate modeling, ecological assessments, and international legal expertise.
Second, Bangladesh should intensify efforts to internationalize discussions on transboundary water governance without unnecessarily escalating bilateral tensions. International norms and legal principles provide important frameworks for protecting downstream rights.
Third, regional cooperation must be broadened beyond narrow water allocation debates. Joint river basin management, environmental restoration initiatives, flood forecasting systems, and climate adaptation programs could create shared incentives for cooperation.
Fourth, Bangladesh should actively build domestic consensus on water security as a national priority. River diplomacy should transcend partisan politics.
Finally, policymakers must recognize that water security is inseparable from national security. Protecting rivers is not simply an environmental concern; it is fundamental to economic resilience, social stability, and long-term sovereignty.
A Relationship Built on Fairness, Not Dependency
Bangladesh and India share deep historical, cultural, economic and geographical ties. A stable and constructive relationship between the two countries remains essential for regional prosperity. However, genuine friendship cannot be built on asymmetry. Nor can sustainable cooperation emerge from policies perceived as unfair by one side.
When legitimate concerns regarding water access are repeatedly ignored or delayed, trust inevitably erodes. India’s policymakers should understand that equitable river management is not a concession to Bangladesh. It is an investment in long-term regional stability.
The costs of environmental degradation, ecological collapse, and diplomatic mistrust will ultimately affect both countries. Shared rivers require shared responsibility. The alternative—a future defined by increasing unilateralism, hydro-nationalism, and strategic competition over water—would benefit no one.
The Time for Principle Is Now
The remarks of Nishikant Dubey may have originated from domestic political calculations, but they carry broader implications. They remind Bangladesh that the struggle for equitable water sharing remains far from over.
As discussions continue over the Ganges Treaty and other transboundary river agreements, Dhaka must resist any pressure to accept arrangements that fail to reflect the principles of fairness, sustainability, and mutual respect.
A downstream nation should never be expected to remain silent while its ecological future is determined elsewhere. Bangladesh’s position should be firm but constructive, principled but pragmatic. The country must advocate not for confrontation, but for justice. Not for privilege, but for equity. Not for dominance, but for partnership.
The rivers that connect Bangladesh and India have sustained civilizations for centuries. Their future should not be shaped by political rhetoric or nationalist calculations. They should be governed by wisdom, science, cooperation, and respect for the rights of all who depend on them. That is not merely Bangladesh’s demand. It is the minimum requirement for a stable and sustainable South Asia in the twenty-first century.
Emran Emon is an eminent
journalist, columnist and global affairs analyst. He can be reached at [email protected]
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