Published: 01:12 AM, 20 June 2026
Evian and the New Great Game: Why South Asia Must Prepare for a World Beyond Globalization
Shahidul Alam Swapan
The 2026 G7 Summit in Evian, France, may ultimately be remembered not for its statements on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, or global debt, but for something far more consequential: its attempt to redefine the architecture of global power in the twenty-first century. Beneath the diplomatic language of “economic resilience,” “de-risking,” and “critical mineral partnerships” lies a profound strategic reality. The era of globalization that dominated the post-Cold War world is gradually giving way to an age of geopolitical economics, where supply chains, technology, energy, and strategic resources are becoming instruments of national power.
For South Asia, this shift represents both a historic opportunity and a serious challenge. Countries such as Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, and the Maldives now find themselves at the intersection of an emerging geopolitical contest that increasingly resembles a new version of the Great Game not over territories, but over markets, minerals, technologies, maritime routes, and strategic influence.
The significance of the Evian Summit lies in its recognition that economic interdependence is no longer viewed by major powers as an unquestioned virtue. For nearly three decades, the global economy operated on the assumption that efficiency mattered more than geopolitics. Production migrated to where costs were lowest. Supply chains stretched across continents. China became the factory of the world, Western nations became the primary consumers, and developing countries supplied labor and markets.
That model is now under intense strain.
The Covid-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how energy dependencies could become strategic liabilities. Meanwhile, China’s rise as a technological and manufacturing superpower has prompted growing concerns in Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, and other capitals about excessive reliance on a single country for critical economic functions.
The G7’s new emphasis on critical minerals reflects this concern. Rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and other strategic resources have become the oil of the digital age. They power electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, semiconductors, advanced weapons, artificial intelligence infrastructure, and telecommunications networks. Control over these resources increasingly translates into geopolitical leverage.
China currently dominates large parts of this ecosystem, not only through mining but also through processing, refining, and manufacturing capacities. The G7’s effort to create alternative supply chains is therefore not merely an economic initiative. It is a strategic response to what Western policymakers perceive as a growing concentration of economic power.
In many respects, Evian marks the formal consolidation of a broader trend that has been unfolding for years: the securitization of economics. National security is no longer confined to military capabilities. Today, semiconductor manufacturing, undersea cables, rare earth processing facilities, ports, data centers, and energy infrastructure are all viewed through the lens of strategic competition.
This transformation carries profound implications for South Asia.
Historically, South Asia occupied a peripheral position in global industrial supply chains. Yet geography and demography are now pushing the region toward the center of global strategic calculations. The Indian Ocean has emerged as one of the most important maritime spaces in the world. Nearly half of global container traffic and a significant share of energy shipments pass through its sea lanes. Simultaneously, South Asia hosts nearly a quarter of humanity and represents one of the largest sources of future economic growth.
As major powers seek to diversify supply chains away from excessive dependence on China, South Asian economies have an unprecedented opportunity to attract investment, manufacturing capacity, and technological partnerships. However, realizing this opportunity will require strategic vision rather than passive optimism.
India has already positioned itself as a major beneficiary of this transition. Western governments increasingly view New Delhi as a critical partner in balancing China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. Through initiatives involving semiconductors, digital infrastructure, defense cooperation, and supply-chain resilience, India is becoming an indispensable actor in emerging geopolitical arrangements.
Yet South Asia’s future cannot be understood solely through the prism of India.
Bangladesh, in particular, occupies a unique position. Over the past two decades, it has transformed itself into one of Asia’s most dynamic economies. Its manufacturing sector, demographic profile, strategic location near the Bay of Bengal, and growing connectivity networks provide significant advantages. As multinational corporations search for alternative production hubs, Bangladesh possesses the potential to become an important node in reconfigured global supply chains.
However, this opportunity comes with complex diplomatic challenges.
China remains one of Bangladesh’s largest development partners and infrastructure investors. Simultaneously, the European Union and the United States remain critical export destinations. Japan has emerged as a major infrastructure partner, while Middle Eastern economies increasingly influence investment and energy dynamics.
In such a context, Bangladesh cannot afford to frame its foreign policy in binary terms. The strategic challenge is not choosing between China and the West. It is developing the capacity to engage all major powers while preserving national autonomy.
The same logic applies across South Asia. Sri Lanka’s debt crisis illustrated the risks of overdependence on any single external actor. Pakistan continues to navigate difficult economic conditions while balancing relationships with China, Gulf states, and Western institutions. Nepal faces growing competition among external powers seeking influence in the Himalayan region. Even smaller states such as the Maldives are increasingly becoming arenas of geopolitical competition.
What makes the current moment particularly significant is that the emerging international order is not evolving toward a simple bipolar structure. Unlike the Cold War, today’s competition is multidimensional. States simultaneously cooperate and compete. Economic integration coexists with strategic rivalry. Countries seek partnerships without necessarily embracing alliances.
This complexity creates both risks and opportunities for middle and smaller powers.
For South Asian nations, the central challenge is avoiding strategic dependency while maximizing strategic relevance. That requires investment in domestic resilience. Infrastructure alone will not be sufficient. The region must strengthen institutions, improve governance, enhance technological capabilities, and develop skilled human capital. In the coming decades, competitiveness will depend not merely on low-cost labor but on innovation, digital capacity, and technological adaptation.
The Evian Summit’s focus on artificial intelligence is particularly relevant in this regard. AI is rapidly emerging as a defining technology of the century. Countries that fail to participate meaningfully in the digital economy risk becoming consumers rather than creators of future wealth. South Asia possesses significant demographic advantages, but demographics alone will not guarantee success. Education systems, research ecosystems, and technological infrastructure must evolve accordingly.
Another critical dimension concerns global debt and financial stability. Many developing economies are struggling under rising borrowing costs, currency pressures, and slowing external demand. The G7’s acknowledgment of these challenges reflects growing recognition that economic instability in the Global South carries systemic consequences for the broader international system.
For Bangladesh and other South Asian economies, prudent debt management, export diversification, and financial resilience will become increasingly important. The age of abundant global liquidity that characterized much of the past decade is unlikely to return soon. Governments must therefore prioritize sustainable growth strategies over short-term expansion financed by excessive borrowing.
Perhaps the most important lesson from Evian is that power in the twenty-first century is becoming increasingly interconnected. Military strength remains important, but it is no longer sufficient. Economic security, technological capability, supply-chain resilience, energy independence, and diplomatic flexibility are becoming equally important determinants of national influence.
This reality demands a new mindset in South Asia.
Too often, discussions about the region’s future remain focused on traditional indicators such as GDP growth rates or infrastructure projects. While these remain important, the emerging world order requires a broader conception of national power. The countries that succeed will be those capable of integrating economic development with strategic foresight.
The G7 summit in Evian was therefore more than a diplomatic gathering. It was a signal that the rules governing globalization are being rewritten. Strategic competition is reshaping international commerce. Technology is becoming a geopolitical asset. Economic networks are increasingly influenced by security considerations.
For South Asia, the implications are profound. The region is no longer merely observing global transformation from the sidelines. It is becoming one of the arenas where that transformation will unfold.
The question is whether South Asian leaders recognize the scale of the moment. The choices made today regarding trade, technology, infrastructure, education, energy, and diplomacy will shape the region’s position in the emerging global order for decades to come.
History rarely announces the arrival of a new era. Yet the message from Evian is difficult to ignore. The world is entering a period where geopolitics and economics are once again inseparable. For South Asia, the challenge is not simply to adapt to this reality, but to shape it in ways that advance the region’s own interests and aspirations.
The future will belong not to those who choose sides, but to those who learn how to navigate a fragmented world with strategic confidence, economic resilience, and diplomatic agility.
Shahidul Alam Swapan is a private
sector financial expert based
in Switzerland.
