Published: 01:48 AM, 23 June 2026
How Bangladesh Studies West Bengal’s Changing Political Landscape
Md. Abu Saim
Shuvendu Adhikari has become a subject of casual political discussion in Bangladesh since the BJP secured a historic victory on May 4, 2026, in the Indian state of Bengal, formerly known as West Bengal. His triumph for the BJP over his former party, the Trinamool Congress (TMC), sparked widespread debate in both Bangladesh and the Indian state ‘Bengal’. However, numerous leaders in India have abandoned their previous affiliate parties to join the BJP, but Shuvendu’s political journey is particularly notable, having departed both the Indian National Congress (INC) and Trinamool Congress before aligning himself with the BJP.
Securing a BJP victory in West Bengal was no easy feat, especially as a significant section of Bengal’s electorate had favored Mamata Banerjee and in a state where the BJP has never won. Yet, following the implementation of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) ahead of the fresh West Bengal elections, it became increasingly apparent that the TMC was unlikely to emerge victorious this time. Allegations and concerns regarding potential electoral interference were also looming. The final outcome appeared to reinforce those perceptions. The BJP captured seats, including in unlikely Muslim-majority districts such as Murshidabad and Malda.
At that time, remarkable concern grew from Bangladesh’s side; why BJP is in a hurry to gain a majority in Bengal particularly. However, subsequent developments have provided greater clarity regarding the strategic motivations behind that political rush.
On May 11, 2026, Shuvendu Adhikari’s cabinet formally approved the transfer of the Siliguri Corridor to the Centre, marking a significant step that would have been impossible under the leadership of former Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.
Much of the BJP’s victory had been anticipated, with the SIR process leaving many Muslim and Dalit voters feeling politically marginalized. Nevertheless, Shuvendu’s role here remained indispensable. He undertook an extraordinary initiative for the BJP government, facilitating the transfer of 120 acres of land to the Centre.
The question now is how Bangladesh views these developments through the prism of national security. The issue assumes added significance at a time when Bangladesh is receiving persistent reports of human push-ins from India, a situation increasingly being perceived as a potential national security concern.
Siliguri Corridor-Centric Development
In Indian media discourse, the Siliguri Corridor— popularly known as the Chicken’s Neck—has long been portrayed as a highly sensitive and strategic issue.
At its narrowest stretch, the Siliguri Corridor spans only about 20–22 kilometers, showcasing its strategic vulnerability. This critical land passage serves as the sole link connecting India’s eight northeastern states— Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Sikkim— to the rest of the country, making its security a matter of enduring national importance.
India has set China as a number one security issue in this region, particularly in light of Beijing’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh in official maps. Recent military confrontations in areas such as Doklam and Ladakh have further reinforced these concerns. Moreover, China’s growing presence through camps near Bhutan’s border in the Chumbi Valley has drawn attention, as the area offers comparatively easier access towards India than the narrow mountainous passes of Sikkim.
Considering these backdrops, India has moved to strengthen the vital Siliguri Corridor in an effort to survive on its eastern front.
Among the most significant developments, first is the construction of an underground railway network of around 40 km that goes from Rangapani to Teen Mile Haat, effectively bypassing the corridor’s chokepoint. One line has been aligned directly with Bagdogra Airport, turning the underground logistics link to support air operations during times of critical necessity. Additionally, the underground railway network is being developed at a depth of approximately 20–24 meters below ground level, a design intended to enhance protection against bunker-cluster explosions and similar threats.
Second, the new West Bengal government has handed over 120 acres of land to the centre. This includes lands around the strategically significant "Chicken's Neck" area, along with seven stretches of National Highways from the state to the national highway authorities. Additionally, lands are to be released to fortify fencing of around 600 km with Bangladesh border, while among the 2200 km West Bengal-Bangladesh border, 1600 km has already been fenced with barbed wire.
Third, 3 new army bases are being made in Chopra of Bengal, Kishanganj in Bihar, Lachit Borphukan, Dhubri in Assam. Strategically, these 3 new garrisons are located around Bangladesh’s Rangpur division.
Fourth, some World War II-era airstrips are being renovated to strategically increase the force of the Indian Air Force in this region. Alongside two critical airports in this area, called Bagdogra and Hasimara airports, these runway airstrips have been identified as Ambari and Panga in Jalpaiguri, Balurghat in South Dinajpur, Jhaljhalia in Malda and Dhubri in Assam.
With the expansion of these military and aviation clusters, Bengal appears increasingly prepared to respond to a wide range of contingencies and strategic challenges, solely focusing on China and Bangladesh.
Joint Rivers with West Bengal
Bangladesh faces another critical factor here, the management of the shared rivers. The Teesta flows not far from the strategically located Siliguri Corridor. The Farakka Barrage over the Ganga River is also located in Murshidabad, within West Bengal’s administrative land.
Teesta, particularly, holds critical importance because Bangladesh’s North Bengal region heavily depends on its water. The region remains one of the country’s key agricultural zones, making the river an indispensable resource for its agricultural production. India has constructed more than 35 dams and barrages along the Teesta, significantly and willingly altering the river’s flow dynamics.
The structures over Teesta, over time, have faced severe ecological vulnerabilities. In 2011, the Teesta III barrage was destroyed during a glacial flash flood, resulting in extensive damage and loss of life, including among communities residing in the Himalayan region. Despite such setbacks, India has continued pursuing the construction of similar projects with renewed interests.
Bangladesh and India have twice come close to making a deal finalizing Teesta’s water sharing— first in 2011, and again in 2017. Although whoever says the deals failed to materialize because Mamata Banerjee was serving as Chief Minister at the time, becomes fundamentally incorrect, and forgets India’s water sharing strategy doesn’t expect certain leadership on particular states, rather the usage of joint river water as a sole political tool. Shuvendu himself has shown little indication of placing the Teesta’s flow into Bangladesh at the center of policy discussions.
A similar debate surrounds Padma. The river’s flow is regulated by the controversial Farakka Barrage, historically whose water-sharing arrangements have been governed through five separate agreements. Most significant of them are the 1977 Agreement on Ganges Water Sharing and the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty. The latter has remained in force for three decades and is scheduled to expire in December this year. Bangladesh now requires a more robust and sustainable framework to ensure that the Padma receives an adequate share of water within its natural course.
While water-sharing factors and developments around the Siliguri Corridor have recently attracted Bangladeshi policymakers’ considerable attention, the issue now commanding the greatest focus is the continuing controversy over the border push-ins.
The Push-In Question: What Lies Ahead?
On May 23, 2026, Shuvendu Adhikari issued an order to set up holding centers across all 23 districts for apprehended foreigners for deportation under his “Detect, Delete and Deport” framework. A day later, on May 24, holding centres were set up in districts including Malda and Murshidabad, where Muslim populations are in majority and already existed there for generations.
Since then, several key border districts in Bangladesh have reportedly witnessed repeated push-in attempts from India. Areas such as Panchagarh, Lalmonirhat, Thakurgaon, Naogaon, Chapainawabganj, Meherpur, Jhinaidah, Jashore and Brahmanbaria have allegedly experienced incidents in which the BSF pushed individuals who had long been residing in India’s West Bengal.
These recent push-in incidents along the Bangladesh-India border have generated growing concern among the Bangladeshis. In particular, residents of border communities have actively assisted the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) in countering these illegal push-in attempts from across the borders, almost majority of them are from India’s Bengal state.
Before January 26, 2026, India reportedly pushed more than 2 thousand people across the Bangladesh border over the course of a year.
But following Shuvendu’s victory, he has claimed more than 4800 people from India have been pushed to Bangladesh. The figures suggest the frequency of such incidents along the border, where the BGB remains on heightened alert to thwart the alleged actions of its Indian counterpart BSF. Discussions between the border forces of the two countries are ongoing, yet there are few indications that the situation is nearing resolution.
Against this political landscape in West Bengal, Bangladesh must act swiftly to safeguard its sovereignty and prevent any attempt to carry out further push-ins across its borders.
Md. Abu Saim studied International
Relations at Dhaka University.
