Published: 11:07 PM, 27 July 2026
Bangladesh Faces a New Security Equation as Myanmar's Conflict Evolves Into Its Next Phase
Md. Abu Saim
Myanmar's civil war has entered a new phase. More than five years after the military coup of February 2021, the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has lost control of large swathes of territory to a combination of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the People's Defence Forces (PDF), the armed wing aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG). Yet the military remains the country's most powerful institution, retaining air superiority, strategic urban centres, and international partners that have prevented its collapse.
For Bangladesh, the changing battlefield is no longer a humanitarian issue centered solely on the Rohingya population. It has become a multidimensional national security challenge involving border management, maritime security, regional connectivity, and great-power competition in the Bay of Bengal.
Understanding, therefore, Myanmar's political economy and the strategic calculations of its external partners are now crucial for Bangladesh's security planning ahead of everything.
From Democratic Transition to Fragmentation
Myanmar's political opening between 2011 and 2021 created hopes that decades of military rule were ending. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won landslide elections in 2015 and again in 2020. Yet the military never fully surrendered power. The coup of February 2021 reversed the democratic transition and transformed nationwide protests into armed resistance. The NUG emerged as a shadow government, while thousands of civilians joined the People's Defence Forces. At the same time, long-established ethnic armed organizations, including the Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Chin resistance groups, and others expanded their campaigns against the junta.
One such pivotal victory shifted the balance of power is Operation 1027, launched by the Brotherhood Alliance in late 2023. The alliance, comprising the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) captured numerous military positions and important trade routes. During 2024 and 2025, the junta reportedly lost multiple regional commands and significant territory, exposing the military's declining operational capability. Today, the Arakan Army controls nearly 90% of Rakhine State's territory, exercising direct authority over 15 of the state's 17 townships, making it increasingly difficult for Bangladesh to engage with the Myanmar Junta government through formal channels to address border-related issues or the Rohingya crisis effectively.
However, these anti-junta victories do not necessarily translate into political unity. Myanmar's resistance remains fragmented. More than twenty influential ethnic armed organizations pursue different political and economic objectives. Some seek federal autonomy, while others prioritize control over natural resources, border trade, taxation, and local governance. These shifting alliances make Myanmar's future highly uncertain.
Moreover, different states of Myanmar are inhabited by different ethnic groups. As a result, the formation of a unified national government remains highly uncertain unless there is a significant positive political change. Even if the Arakan Army were to capture the capital, or the Kachin Independence Army were to take control of Naypyidaw, the other ethnic armed organizations would be unlikely to accept the authority of a single ethnic group. While the situation may appear similar to the chaotic period following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, Myanmar's ethnic landscape is far more complex. It is not simply a matter of sectarian divisions such as Sunni and Shia; rather, the country is home to more than 20 major ethnic armed groups, each with its own political and military aspirations.
On the other hand, Myanmar's conflict is increasingly driven by political economy rather than ideology alone. Control over jade mines, rare earth minerals, timber, natural gas, ports, border trade, narcotics, and illicit economies finances armed actors across the country. As territory changes hands, so do economic assets. This explains why alliances among armed groups remain fluid rather than permanent. Neither the junta nor many resistance organizations possess sufficient resources to decisively defeat the other. Instead, both compete for revenue sources, external support, and strategic infrastructure. For Bangladesh, this means instability is unlikely to disappear even if the military weakens further.
Why Sanctions Have Failed
Western sanctions to isolate Min Aung Hlaing after the 2021 coup have failed in broader aspects. The Myanmar junta, under the leadership of Min Aung Hlaing has diversified its diplomatic and military partnerships by purchasing weapons from Russia, China, and reportedly maintaining links with North Korea.
Targeted sanctions against military-owned businesses have imposed economic costs on the top generals but have failed to alter the strategic calculations of Myanmar's leadership. First of all, the junta has strategically navigated diplomatic channels with countries like Russia and China, which are already defending themselves against Western sanctions and confronting the West without hesitation. Myanmar has also built up a close relationship with North Korea. Recently, through covert North Korean military technology transfers, Myanmar has reportedly been building its first domestically made coastal attack submarine. The submarine is based on North Korea's Sang-O-class coastal attack submarine design, approximately 40 meters in length, placing it within the category of small diesel-electric coastal submarines optimized for littoral combat, infiltration missions, and shallow-water strike operations, making it well suited to operate in the shallow waters of the Bay of Bengal. The submarine's construction site is located within a newly expanded naval infrastructure complex that was also developed by China, indicating that Myanmar will not stop at building just one submarine of this kind. These developments have occurred despite sanctions, through Myanmar’s military technology transfers and covert defence-industrial cooperation.
Although there is no evidence of an imminent maritime confrontation, Bangladesh cannot ignore increasing submarine activity in the Bay of Bengal. For Bangladesh, strategic actions like undersea surveillance, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, maritime domain awareness, and intelligence-sharing will become increasingly important.
Besides this, the Myanmar general's recent visit to India has demonstrated that the general is strategically moving from diplomatic isolation toward greater international engagement, strengthening his prospects of maintaining his grip on power. Visiting India is also a smart decision from his perspective, as India is a major economy and is unlikely to concede to Western pressure over the visit of the Myanmar general.
Min Aung Hlaing may be unpopular in his country, but his recent diplomacy and strategic maneuvers suggest that he remains capable of consolidating and sustaining his hold on power.
From CMEC to China–Myanmar–Bangladesh Corridor
China has already institutionalized the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), linking Yunnan Province with Kyaukphyu on Myanmar's Bay of Bengal coast through roads, railways, pipelines, ports, and special economic zones.
If Myanmar eventually stabilizes, whether under military influence or a negotiated political arrangement, the long expected China–Myanmar–Bangladesh connectivity framework could effectively bring the China–Myanmar–Bangladesh Corridor (CMBC) to life.
But if Myanmar's situation remains fragmented, Bangladesh should not despair. First of all, the CMBC connectivity initiative should remain on a slow and steady but sustainable path to connect with China, as Bangladesh and China's bilateral trade hovers around $24 billion annually.
Secondly, Bangladesh should launch trade on a small scale through the Chattogram–Kyaukphyu–Mandalay–Muse–Kunming route to assess the opportunities and risks under the CMBC framework, and evaluate how such connectivity could lead to integrated trade, industrial cooperation, and strategic engagement. This could also begin by utilizing the existing CMEC connectivity, with Bangladesh simply ensuring initial trade access through Kyaukphyu Port. This is important because Bangladesh's ties with Myanmar have always remained shadowy, and an opportunity has emerged to better understand this complex neighbor through Chinese mediation.
Bangladesh's Strategic Response
Myanmar's conflict should no longer be viewed solely through the humanitarian lens of the Rohingya crisis. It is now a strategic issue involving Bangladesh’s maritime security, border stability, regional connectivity, and expanding influence of both China and USA’s Pacific partners.
Bangladesh should therefore pursue a multi-layered strategy: maintain communication with all relevant actors without compromising diplomatic neutrality; strengthen its own border and naval capabilities; prepare for prolonged instability rather than rapid conflict resolution; diversify strategic partnerships while preserving balanced relations with both China and the West; and continue advocating for a sustainable, internationally supported solution to the Rohingya crisis.
Bangladesh, situated directly across the frontier, cannot remain a passive observer. Its national security increasingly depends not only on events inside Myanmar, but also on how effectively Dhaka anticipates the geopolitical transformation unfolding along its south-eastern border.
Md. Abu Saim completed post
graduation in International
Relations and International Political Economy from Dhaka University.
