Published: 05:05 PM, 25 September 2026
China’s Indian Ocean Strategy and its Quest for Strategic Dependence
As the United States began reopening its embassy in Seychelles in 2023, the decision was read by many as part of a wider effort to respond to China’s growing influence across small island states. Washington had closed its embassy in the country in 1996, and the intervening years had seen China establish a substantial presence through schools, hospitals, housing and public infrastructure. Seychelles’ President had too acknowledged that this engagement had created considerable goodwill, particularly because China had provided services that other external powers had neglected. The episode nonetheless illustrated a broader change in the Indian Ocean; countries that were once treated as peripheral to major-power competition have become increasingly important to the strategic calculations of Beijing, New Delhi and Washington.
The significance of Seychelles does not lie in the size of its economy or its population. Its location in the western Indian Ocean, its maritime territory and its position along routes connecting Africa, the Middle East and Asia give it a relevance that extends beyond its domestic market. China’s growing engagement with the island nation is therefore part of a wider effort to develop economic and political relationships across the Indian Ocean, where infrastructure, trade and maritime security are becoming increasingly connected.
The region matters to China for several reasons as it provides access to the energy-producing countries of the Persian Gulf, the markets of Africa and Europe, and the maritime routes through which Chinese trade is conducted. China depends on the region for a substantial share of its energy imports, while its broader commercial interests rely on the security of maritime transportation. The ocean also connects China’s western Indian Ocean interests to the Malacca Strait, through which a large proportion of its energy imports pass.
These economic considerations have encouraged Beijing to expand its overseas infrastructure and diplomatic engagement. The Belt and Road Initiative has provided a framework for developing ports, transport networks and commercial facilities, while Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy banks have become important sources of capital for countries seeking infrastructure investment.
For China, however, the Indian Ocean is not only a commercial space. It is also a region in which closer economic relationships can support diplomatic access and create opportunities for security cooperation. This does not mean that every Chinese-funded project is intended to serve military purposes, or that countries receiving Chinese investment have surrendered their foreign-policy autonomy. The more relevant concern is whether the accumulation of economic and political relationships can gradually increase Beijing’s influence over the choices available to smaller states.
Economic engagement and the expansion of influence
The Maldives presents a useful example to detangle such a case. The country occupies a position near important maritime routes in the central Indian Ocean, while its tourism-dependent economy makes it reliant on external investment and connectivity. Chinese involvement in infrastructure development expanded under President Abdulla Yameen, including through the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, which connects Malé with Hulhumalé and Hulhule.
The bridge provided a significant transport link for the capital region and demonstrated the political appeal of infrastructure projects that deliver visible benefits to a relatively small population. China’s engagement subsequently expanded under President Mohamed Muizzu, who came to power in 2023 after campaigning on an “India Out” platform. During Muizzu’s visit to China in January 2024, the two countries agreed to establish a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and signed agreements covering several areas of cooperation.
Malé has its own domestic political competition and economic interests, and successive governments have sought to manage relationships with both India and China. However, the relationship illustrates how economic engagement can create a foundation for wider strategic cooperation, particularly when a country is seeking investment and development assistance.
Chinese research vessels operating in the Indian Ocean have attracted attention because of the potential overlap between scientific activity, maritime surveillance and strategic interests. The available evidence may not necessarily establish that Chinese infrastructure in the Maldives has created a military base, but it does show why maritime activity and economic engagement are increasingly examined together.
The diplomatic competition with Taiwan
China’s use of economic and diplomatic engagement to expand its influence is also visible in the Pacific, where Beijing has successfully persuaded several island countries to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. In 2019, Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established ties with China. Nauru followed in January 2024. These decisions reduced Taiwan’s formal diplomatic presence in the Pacific and demonstrated the importance of island states in the competition between Beijing and Taipei.
China’s approach has combined diplomatic pressure with offers of economic assistance, infrastructure and development cooperation. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies has described the competition with Taiwan as a central component of China’s engagement with Pacific Island countries. The scale of Chinese economic resources gives Beijing an advantage in offering large infrastructure projects and broader economic partnerships. The Solomon Islands case is particularly relevant because the diplomatic switch was followed by an expansion of Chinese economic and security ties. China funded a major sports stadium in Honiara, and the two countries subsequently signed a security agreement in 2022. The sequence demonstrates how economic engagement, diplomatic recognition and security cooperation can become connected within China’s wider foreign-policy approach.
The Pacific experience is relevant to the Indian Ocean because it illustrates a broader diplomatic method. Beijing’s economic partnerships can strengthen its relationships with small island states, while the resulting political ties may support China’s wider strategic interests. The circumstances in the Pacific and Indian Ocean are different, but the relationship between development assistance and diplomatic influence is worth examining in both regions.
The importance of island states to China’s maritime strategy
China’s engagement with Indian Ocean Island states is also connected to its wider maritime strategy. The region contains important shipping routes and provides access to the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Its geography makes it relevant to China’s energy security and overseas trade, while its ports and maritime facilities offer opportunities for commercial and logistical engagement.
China’s overseas military facility in Djibouti, established in 2017, demonstrates that Beijing has developed a sustained military presence in the Indian Ocean region. The facility supports Chinese naval operations, anti-piracy missions and other military activities. Its existence does not mean that every Chinese commercial port is intended to support military operations, but it does show that China’s interests in the region extend beyond trade.
The concern for regional powers is therefore not necessarily the construction of a single Chinese military base. It is the cumulative effect of expanding Chinese economic, diplomatic and security relationships across the region. Ports, infrastructure projects, maritime agreements and political partnerships may each serve different purposes, but together they can create a more favorable environment for China’s long-term presence.
This is particularly relevant for smaller island states, whose governments often seek to maintain relationships with multiple external powers. Chinese investment may provide valuable development opportunities, while closer security cooperation may offer additional resources and diplomatic support. The challenge is to ensure that these relationships do not gradually reduce the ability of island governments to pursue independent policies.
China’s growing engagement with Indian Ocean Island states reflects a combination of economic, diplomatic and strategic interests. Infrastructure investment has provided opportunities for development, while closer political relationships have expanded Beijing’s regional presence. The Maldives and Seychelles illustrate different aspects of this engagement, while the Pacific cases involving Taiwan demonstrate how economic and diplomatic relationships can reinforce one another.
These developments indicate that economic partnerships can create strategic opportunities that extend beyond development finance. The central question for the region is whether smaller island states can maintain sufficient economic and political autonomy while engaging with a major power whose interests in the Indian Ocean are becoming increasingly important. For regional stakeholders, this requires sustained engagement with regional partners, while recognising that the competition for influence will be shaped not only by security concerns but also by the economic choices available to island governments.
>> Source: PML Daily
The significance of Seychelles does not lie in the size of its economy or its population. Its location in the western Indian Ocean, its maritime territory and its position along routes connecting Africa, the Middle East and Asia give it a relevance that extends beyond its domestic market. China’s growing engagement with the island nation is therefore part of a wider effort to develop economic and political relationships across the Indian Ocean, where infrastructure, trade and maritime security are becoming increasingly connected.
The region matters to China for several reasons as it provides access to the energy-producing countries of the Persian Gulf, the markets of Africa and Europe, and the maritime routes through which Chinese trade is conducted. China depends on the region for a substantial share of its energy imports, while its broader commercial interests rely on the security of maritime transportation. The ocean also connects China’s western Indian Ocean interests to the Malacca Strait, through which a large proportion of its energy imports pass.
These economic considerations have encouraged Beijing to expand its overseas infrastructure and diplomatic engagement. The Belt and Road Initiative has provided a framework for developing ports, transport networks and commercial facilities, while Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy banks have become important sources of capital for countries seeking infrastructure investment.
For China, however, the Indian Ocean is not only a commercial space. It is also a region in which closer economic relationships can support diplomatic access and create opportunities for security cooperation. This does not mean that every Chinese-funded project is intended to serve military purposes, or that countries receiving Chinese investment have surrendered their foreign-policy autonomy. The more relevant concern is whether the accumulation of economic and political relationships can gradually increase Beijing’s influence over the choices available to smaller states.
Economic engagement and the expansion of influence
The Maldives presents a useful example to detangle such a case. The country occupies a position near important maritime routes in the central Indian Ocean, while its tourism-dependent economy makes it reliant on external investment and connectivity. Chinese involvement in infrastructure development expanded under President Abdulla Yameen, including through the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, which connects Malé with Hulhumalé and Hulhule.
The bridge provided a significant transport link for the capital region and demonstrated the political appeal of infrastructure projects that deliver visible benefits to a relatively small population. China’s engagement subsequently expanded under President Mohamed Muizzu, who came to power in 2023 after campaigning on an “India Out” platform. During Muizzu’s visit to China in January 2024, the two countries agreed to establish a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and signed agreements covering several areas of cooperation.
Malé has its own domestic political competition and economic interests, and successive governments have sought to manage relationships with both India and China. However, the relationship illustrates how economic engagement can create a foundation for wider strategic cooperation, particularly when a country is seeking investment and development assistance.
Chinese research vessels operating in the Indian Ocean have attracted attention because of the potential overlap between scientific activity, maritime surveillance and strategic interests. The available evidence may not necessarily establish that Chinese infrastructure in the Maldives has created a military base, but it does show why maritime activity and economic engagement are increasingly examined together.
The diplomatic competition with Taiwan
China’s use of economic and diplomatic engagement to expand its influence is also visible in the Pacific, where Beijing has successfully persuaded several island countries to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. In 2019, Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established ties with China. Nauru followed in January 2024. These decisions reduced Taiwan’s formal diplomatic presence in the Pacific and demonstrated the importance of island states in the competition between Beijing and Taipei.
China’s approach has combined diplomatic pressure with offers of economic assistance, infrastructure and development cooperation. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies has described the competition with Taiwan as a central component of China’s engagement with Pacific Island countries. The scale of Chinese economic resources gives Beijing an advantage in offering large infrastructure projects and broader economic partnerships. The Solomon Islands case is particularly relevant because the diplomatic switch was followed by an expansion of Chinese economic and security ties. China funded a major sports stadium in Honiara, and the two countries subsequently signed a security agreement in 2022. The sequence demonstrates how economic engagement, diplomatic recognition and security cooperation can become connected within China’s wider foreign-policy approach.
The Pacific experience is relevant to the Indian Ocean because it illustrates a broader diplomatic method. Beijing’s economic partnerships can strengthen its relationships with small island states, while the resulting political ties may support China’s wider strategic interests. The circumstances in the Pacific and Indian Ocean are different, but the relationship between development assistance and diplomatic influence is worth examining in both regions.
The importance of island states to China’s maritime strategy
China’s engagement with Indian Ocean Island states is also connected to its wider maritime strategy. The region contains important shipping routes and provides access to the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Its geography makes it relevant to China’s energy security and overseas trade, while its ports and maritime facilities offer opportunities for commercial and logistical engagement.
China’s overseas military facility in Djibouti, established in 2017, demonstrates that Beijing has developed a sustained military presence in the Indian Ocean region. The facility supports Chinese naval operations, anti-piracy missions and other military activities. Its existence does not mean that every Chinese commercial port is intended to support military operations, but it does show that China’s interests in the region extend beyond trade.
The concern for regional powers is therefore not necessarily the construction of a single Chinese military base. It is the cumulative effect of expanding Chinese economic, diplomatic and security relationships across the region. Ports, infrastructure projects, maritime agreements and political partnerships may each serve different purposes, but together they can create a more favorable environment for China’s long-term presence.
This is particularly relevant for smaller island states, whose governments often seek to maintain relationships with multiple external powers. Chinese investment may provide valuable development opportunities, while closer security cooperation may offer additional resources and diplomatic support. The challenge is to ensure that these relationships do not gradually reduce the ability of island governments to pursue independent policies.
China’s growing engagement with Indian Ocean Island states reflects a combination of economic, diplomatic and strategic interests. Infrastructure investment has provided opportunities for development, while closer political relationships have expanded Beijing’s regional presence. The Maldives and Seychelles illustrate different aspects of this engagement, while the Pacific cases involving Taiwan demonstrate how economic and diplomatic relationships can reinforce one another.
These developments indicate that economic partnerships can create strategic opportunities that extend beyond development finance. The central question for the region is whether smaller island states can maintain sufficient economic and political autonomy while engaging with a major power whose interests in the Indian Ocean are becoming increasingly important. For regional stakeholders, this requires sustained engagement with regional partners, while recognising that the competition for influence will be shaped not only by security concerns but also by the economic choices available to island governments.
>> Source: PML Daily
