Published: 01:24 AM, 30 September 2026
Is the Makkah Pact a Nonstarter?
The much hyped and over publicized Makkah Trilateral Defence Pact signed recently by the Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye seems to be struggling to find its feet as its first test on ground failed to take off in the fresh Houthi territorial gains in Mocha causing a severe setback to Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan is believed to have not acceded to the Saudi request for any military intervention in coming to its aid.
Also, on its part, US offered intelligence rather than military aid when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought (September 10) military assistance from President Donald Trump to help fight Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis, amid reports of Houthis stepping up their threat to the Red Sea. Trump held at least two phone conversations with the Saudi leader but did not agree to the U.S. striking Houthis as per a Reuters report. Therefore, the latest defence pact as of now, looks to be under immense strain.
Meanwhile, Riaz Khokhar who is a Research Officer with the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), Islamabad has articulated his professional views in an opinion piece in Al Jazeera. The repeated attacks against Saudi energy, civil, and defence facilities, combined with the maritime blockage by Iran and the Houthis, also directly raise the question of the Makkah Pact’s operationalization between the three signatories. According to him, the three countries have since established a joint secretariat, with its headquarters in Riyadh, with Pakistan taking the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.
The pact now remains in a gestation period. It does not publicly identify the thresholds or scenarios under which a member would move to direct military intervention. Its organizational and institutional structure, including rules of engagement, mechanisms of consultation, and collective defence and deterrence, are yet to be formally developed. Reverting to the question of how the pact will be operational if a member state is attacked earlier this week, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that an unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom, would make the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement operational. Asif, however, did not share specific details on what shape that operationalization would take. Last month, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that the Makkah Pact would work the same way as NATO: If a member state is attacked, it must actively request and define the specific type of help it needs. NATO’s Article 4 allows for a member to call alliance consultations and exchange of information while Article 5 requires mutual assistance from allies, but it leaves each state to decide the nature of that assistance.
In this context, if the Makkah Pact is to be operationalized, it would have to be Saudi Arabia that defines the type of military assistance and involvement that it needs. If, for example, Riyadh makes a real request for Pakistani direct military intervention, beyond materiel and intelligence support, Islamabad would be obliged to comply. But the request, and the scale of the response, would still likely need to be defined and agreed in a consultation meeting. For now, none of this has been tested as Riyadh has not invoked the pact with either Pakistan or Turkiye.
In the meantime, diplomatic efforts have intensified, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud talking to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Islamabad has also publicly urged Iran to rein in the Houthis from attacking Saudi Arabia and threatening the Bab al-Mandeb, and has reminded Tehran of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh’s defence through the pact. Ankara would likely to play its own part in diplomatically restraining the Houthis and Iran. If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or the Bab al-Mandeb continue, Turkiye and Pakistan may expand the air and technological support they already provide. Islamabad already has an air squadron of about 16 JF-17 Thunder multirole aircraft, defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.
But a direct military operation as per the assessment of Riaz Khokhar, by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains unlikely at this moment. Given the disastrous and lasting impacts of its participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US, Pakistan would be far more wary of joining a war against Iran and its allies, for fear of spillover into its western border provinces’ economy, domestic security, sectarian balance, and societal harmony. Pakistani leaders would also find it hard to build domestic consensus for direct attacks on the Houthis or a fight with Iran.
The likely scenario therefore, is that Pakistan would increase joint diplomatic pressure on Iran to restrain the Houthis, further augment its support for Saudi defence, and push for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. Adopting this restraint could still keep the essence of the Makkah Pact intact, while putting more weight behind regional de-escalation. The new security architecture that agreements like the Makkah Pact are setting up will take longer to mature. Until the mechanisms and rules of collective response develop, Pakistan’s existing bilateral defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will continue to focus only on defence needs and hence any military intervention looks remote making the pact not so effective on ground as was perhaps anticipated.
It is also pertinent to mention that Pakistan is thought to have ruled out any further expansion of the Makkah pact principally in terms of inducting a new signatory. Bangladesh in this context may have to wait in case it is aspiring to join the deal.
Dr. Shantanu Mukharji is a retired
IPS officer and former
National Security Adviser in Mauritius. Views expressed in the article are the author's personal opinions.
