Published: 08:14 PM, 15 November 2026
Between Russia and Ukraine: India’s Foray as a Peacemaker
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi greets Russian President Vladimir Putin at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, Dec. 5, 2025. (Credit: PMO India)
"New Delhi’s relations with Moscow are strong, but as far as the Ukraine war is concerned, India enjoys little leverage over Russia’s decisions."
On November 9, a day before U.S.-mediated two-day talks between Russia and Ukraine began in the capital of the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Following the phone call, Modi posted on X about the “productive telephone conversation” that “reviewed our wide-ranging bilateral cooperation.” Modi also vaguely referred to “India’s firm commitment to contributing in every possible way towards a peaceful resolution.”
Zelenskyy wrote on X a little later. His comments were more revealing. According to the post, Zelenskyy briefed Modi “on the latest diplomatic developments.” He also revealed that they “discussed Russia’s blocking of grain exports via the Black Sea” and claimed that “India is ready to mediate in establishing food corridors.”
A few hours later, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar dialed his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, to speak about the conflict and “on-going diplomatic initiatives.”
The flurry of calls would seem to demonstrate that New Delhi is watching the attempted peace process closely. Similar to the failures of earlier rounds, the Abu Dhabi talks, which began on November 10, ended inconclusively. The stakes for both countries are too high to be reconciled in a single round, and it remains to be seen how many compromises each side is willing to make on its ruptured sense of security and its strategic and economic interests in the future to bring the war to an end.
Beyond the parties to the conflict and their immediate neighbors, India has its own reasons to make an attempt at peacemaking. The prolonged war has been one of the three primary drivers of global economic disruption, as well as a factor in the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and the Iran war. Thus, its end would matter greatly to New Delhi.
Peace in Ukraine could bring three direct benefits to India. First, it could ease pressures on energy and food security. The war has disrupted global oil and gas markets, forcing India, which imports most of its crude, to navigate volatile prices and shifting sanctions regimes. It has also squeezed supplies of fertilizer and edible oils, adding to domestic inflation. India is the world’s largest vegetable oil importer, and much of its supply previously came from Ukraine. In September, these imports fell to their lowest level in more than four years, prompting refiners to raise palm oil purchases from Malaysia and Indonesia to their highest level. Modi has even appealed to Indians to cut their edible oil consumption, though without much success. Blocked Black Sea grain exports have kept global food prices elevated, hurting import-dependent economies including India. A lasting settlement would stabilize energy prices, restore predictable supply chains, and reopen shipping lanes, easing pressure on India’s import bill and on household budgets.
Second, India’s diplomatic bandwidth to strengthen relations with both Moscow and Washington could expand even with a limited relaxation of tensions between Russia and the West. For years, New Delhi has walked a tightrope, buying Russian arms and discounted oil while deepening defense, technology, and trade ties with the United States. Western pressure over India’s purchases from Russia, including the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, has forced New Delhi into uncomfortable explanations and costly trade-offs. A thaw would lower the stakes of that diplomatic conundrum. India could pursue its strategic autonomy without being seen as choosing sides, and engage Moscow and Washington on its own terms rather than defensively.
Third, progress toward peace in Ukraine could give fresh momentum to India’s growing economic and strategic partnership with Europe. Europe has emerged as a key player for New Delhi, with the long-negotiated India-EU free trade agreement, defense cooperation, and technology ties all gaining pace. In the first week of November, India and the EU concluded negotiations on India’s association with Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research and innovation program, a potential step toward long-term institutional research cooperation. Yet the war on Europe’s eastern flank has absorbed much of the continent’s political attention, budgets, and security planning, and it has complicated engagement with India over its Russian links. A settlement would free Brussels and European capitals to focus on trade, investment, clean energy, and supply chain partnerships. It may even ease European discomfort over India’s ties with Moscow, allowing a more forward-looking relationship.
To secure these gains, India, after its initial reluctance to get involved in the war, has of late tried to insert itself as a mediator, seeking limited yet fruitful outcomes. On September 3, Jaishankar visited Ukraine, met Zelenskyy, and held bilateral consultations with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, marking the first-ever stand-alone bilateral visit by an Indian external affairs minister to Ukraine. In October, India proposed a three-part truce aimed at halting attacks on energy facilities and other infrastructure, keeping grain and energy flowing through the Black Sea, and ending strikes on commercial shipping.
Yet India’s success is not guaranteed. New Delhi’s relations with Moscow are strong, built on shared history and ongoing military and energy transactions. Still, as far as the Ukraine war is concerned, New Delhi enjoys little leverage over the Kremlin’s decisions. Modi’s repeated adage that “this is not a time for war” has been acknowledged yet ignored by Putin, and New Delhi has been slow to recognize how low it ranks in Moscow’s priorities beyond being a strategic market. Indeed, some of the worst Russian attacks on Ukraine have taken place since Jaishankar’s Kyiv visit in September.
Even so, the stakes are high enough that New Delhi is unlikely to step back. With limited leverage over Moscow, India’s realistic role may be less that of a peacemaker than a facilitator, using its access to both Moscow and Kyiv to keep channels open and push for humanitarian and economic arrangements such as the Black Sea food corridor. To emerge as a credible peacemaker, India, a rising power with global ambitions that include a U.N. Security Council seat, will need to cultivate stronger diplomatic and institutional leverages and a commitment to long term solutions in the realm of conflict resolution.
Written by: Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza (The author is the founder & president, Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), a senior research fellow, University of Massachusetts Amherst and visiting faculty at the Naval War College, Goa, India.)
>> Source: The Diplomat
