The 1971 East Pakistan Genocide: A realist perspective

The genocide in East Pakistan was perhaps among the few that did not come as a surprise, not least to the victims. It accompanied the birth of a new nation leaving horrible birthmarks that disfigure Bangladeshi society to this day. Bangladesh in 1971 was the site of multiple conflicts: a civil war between the the two wings of Pakistan, communal violence between Bengalis and non-Bengalis, a genocide, an guerilla war, a conventional war and a counter genocide.

 In each of these conflicts perpetrators, victims and onlookers often exchanged roles. A total study of the conflict is beyond the scope of this essay. This essay examines the causes, course and results of one sub-conflict-the genocide against Bengalis by the West Pakistani army-and attempts to explain it through a Realist perspective.

Pakistan 1971: Sturm und Drang Tropical Cyclone Bhola, a category 3 storm, made landfall on the East Pakistan coastline on November 12, 1970. It claimed between 250,000 to 500,000 lives 4. It also set off a chain of events that would result in a genocide, another war between India and Pakistan, the birth of a new state and the death of an old theory. Unequal halves. By 1970, the uneasy relationship between Pakistan's two geographically-separated wings was under severe strain.

 The poorer, more populous, Bengali-speaking East Pakistan came to realize that it was effectively a colony of the richer, Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan. The ruling civilian and military elite belonged to the West, as did the top business families5. While the bulk of the country's foreign exchange earnings came from the export of jute from the East Pakistan, it received only a third of the money spent on development projects6.

Moreover, more than two decades of co-habitation had not diminished the condescending attitudes that the West Pakistanis had for their Bengali compatriots-the latter were seen as "low lying people of a low lying land"7 whose commitment to Pakistan was polluted by Hindu culture and a large Hindu minority8. Some scholars have argued that by 1970, Pakistan's ruling elite had come to realize that the east wing was about to become a drain on the economy: jute export revenues were declining and the economy hadn't diversified beyond agriculture.

 Also while the doctrine "the defence of the East lies in the West" allowed Pakistan to devote a relatively small proportion of its military resources directly defending the east wing from an Indian invasion, the military government was aware that stationing and supplying forces there was likely to pose a heavy financial burden in the long term9. An elusive transition. It was in the context of these deepening rifts that General Yahya Khan, the president of Pakistan's military government, announced elections to the national assembly that would herald the country's transition to democracy.

In mid-1970, it was expected that a government dominated by political parties from the west wing would be in place, in all likelihood with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the left-leaning Pakistan People's Party (PPP) as prime minister. Mujibur Rahman's Awami League was expected to do well in East Pakistan. Bhola struck after elections had been announced but before the scheduled elections on December 7th, 1970.

The government's slow and lacklustre relief efforts to one of the country's worst calamities in decades further alienated the Bengalis10. The result was a overwhelming wave of support for Mujib's Awami League which had made the battle for provincial autonomy the central plank of its political agenda. In the event, the elections resulted in a overall majority for the Awami League in the national assembly11, giving it the power to execute its promise of securing autonomy for East Pakistan. Seeing his political ambitions at the risk of being washed away, Bhutto precipitated a political crisis by refusing to attend the national assembly session. General Yahya postponed the session that had been set for March 3rd, 1971, setting off protests and riots in East Pakistan.

On March 7th, Mujib spoke at a public meeting called for substantive autonomy but stopped short of advocating secession. He also called for civil disobedience and non co-operation to protest against the postponement (and feared cancellation) of the national assembly session. While hartals were widely observed, disrupting normal life, the protests were not peaceful.

There were cases of security forces firing on protesters and also violent riots between Bengalis and 'Biharis' (non-Bengalis) 13. West Pakistani soldiers from the Pakistan army were subjected to insult, economic boycotts and in some cases fatal attacks14. Military moves. While the army did not respond to these attacks on its personnel, it is likely that the military leadership had already decided on a brutal military course to suppress Bengali moves towards secession.

Lieutenant General Tikka Khan replaced Admiral Syed Mohammed Ahsan as the military governor of East Pakistan. Lieutenant General A A K Niazi took over as military commander from the conscientious Lieutenant-General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. While General Yahya and Bhutto flew to Dhaka to negotiate with Mujib, the army sent reinforcements to its eastern wing. India had cut off overflight rights, as a result of which troops were moved by air and sea (via Sri Lanka).

At least 10,000 additional West Pakistani troops were moved to Dhaka between February and March bringing (non-Bengali) troop strength to around 30,00015. A number of tanks were moved from Rangpur on the Indian border, to Dhaka. This led Sydney Schanberg, an American journalist, to conclude that "the negotiations were merely a smokescreen to buy time until enough troops had been brought in to launch the attack."

 The army attacked on March 25  and Mujib declared independence for Bangladesh soon after. The genocide had started. Terror as an instrument of policy A whiff of gunpowder would overawe the meek Bengalis17. Why did the military government decide to use firepower against its Bengali citizens? Firstly, it was faced with a scenario where, at best, the government would fall into Bengali hands, and at worst, would lead to a break-up of the country. General Yahya and the more hardline members of the army's top leadership decided to terrorize the east wing into submission.

Even if they had wanted to, it would have been almost impossible for the army to control a hostile population of 75 million Bengalis using gentler tactics. Instead, they calculated that the Bengalis, who they saw as weak, non-martial and cowardly would give up their rebellion out of fear. Hindu phobia. Secondly, the military leadership saw a need to destroy what it saw as the pernicious Hindu influence over Bengali society that had both corrupted Bengali Muslims and fuelled secessionist impulses (and also acted as a fifth column for India).

They calculated that purifying East Pakistan, by cleansing the population of the Hindus, by killing them or forcing them to neighboring India, would supplant its Bengali national identity with an Islamic one18. Perpetrators. The West Pakistani army was the principal perpetrator of the Bengali genocide.

 In addition to regular soldiers and paramilitary troops, the military government also constituted razakars, or armed militias from among the Bihari and Bengali citizens. The two main groups-Al Badr and Al Shams-would later gain considerable notoriety, not least for the killing of around a 1000 intellectuals towards the end of the war in early-December 1971. In addition, a large number of people acted as informers and collaborators-either voluntarily or out of coercion. Who were the victims?

The army set out to exterminate not only those Bengalis who, in its view, had the intention to move the east wing towards secession, but also those who had the capacity. In other words, both existing and potential votaries of Bangladesh were targets for killing19. The first category included Awami League members and supporters, including Bengali intellectuals, university students, the urban poor.

The army carried out "search and destroy" operations in the countryside- essentially burning down entire villages on the hint of a suspicion of their aiding rebel fighters, or as a deterrent. Women were special targets during this phase. A large number were the victims of "hit-and-run" rape, often carried out in view of their male family members (who were subsequently killed). A relatively smaller number were taken away and kept in captivity as sex-slaves. Most estimates put the number of rape victims as being around 200,000 to 400,00025. The refugee crisis worsened and around 30,000 to 50,000 refugees were crossing the border into India each day. "Scorched Earth".

 The final phase, from October to December 16th, saw the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan and ended with the surrender of the Pakistan army's eastern command, under Gen Niazi, to a joint India Bangladesh forces under Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora. It also saw a final bout of targeted killings of intellectuals: university professors, doctors, lawyers, engineers and other professionals, at the hands of the Pakistan army and the razakars. Around 1000 intellectuals were killed in Dhaka, two days before the Pakistani surrender, in what might have been a kind of "scorched earth policy", the objective of which is hard to discern. It is generally believed that these killings were carried out to destroy the most valuable human capital that the new nation needed.

But it was a lightning war, and while Gen Niazi and his troops in the eastern command were aware that their own position was increasingly hopeless, it is possible that they continued to believe that Pakistan would get a upper hand on the western front, and force a overall stalemate. In the event, Pakistan did not launch an all-out war againt India, preferring to end the war with the fall of Dhaka, and electing to not further risk West Pakistan from being overrun by the Indian army Vengeance.

The Pakistani surrender was followed by widespread reprisals against Biharis and those that the Bengalis saw as collaborators. The Indian Army's attempt to protect the Bihari population from the wrath of the Bangladeshis could not prevent the killing of around 150,000 people28. Many thousands were interned in camps ahead of their expulsion to (West) Pakistan.

On the one hand Mukti Bahini forces exacted vengeance against razakars and collaborators, including Bengali men in the rural areas. On the other the popular resentment over the role of pro-Pakistan elements took the shape of inter-ethnic communal riots of which Biharis bore the brunt. It was genocide was it genocide? In sharp contrast to other conflicts of the late-20th century, the mass killings in East Pakistan were labelled as "genocide" fairly early and received considerable coverage in the international media.

The writer is India-based Journalist

- Nitin Pai


The writer is India-based Journalist